The Political Economy of the Second Migration: Fair Employment Laws and Black Interstate Migration Decisions, 1940-1970

Kathy Chao
Faculty Advisor: Michael Haines
Submitted for Honors in Economics
Spring 2015

Abstract: This paper examines the role of state fair employment laws in determining the destination choices of black migrants in the latter phase of the Great Migration. Although the timeframe of state-level fair employment enactment (1945-63) aligns well with that of the second migration (1940-70), there has not yet been an attempt to empirically examine the extent to which the laws attracted or deterred migrants. Using state-level data from the US Census and individual-level data from IPUMS USA samples for years 1940-70, I run a difference-in-difference-in-difference model to estimate the relationship between various measures of fair employment legislation and short-term and lifetime interstate migration for black and white men. I find that passage of fair employment legislation was the most effective at attracting black migrants in the middle of the period (roughly 1955-60), while passage decreased in deterministic power in the later years. In general, the earliest laws were not independently attractive at all, except when the sample is limited to the non-South. I find no evidence that older laws were more attractive than more recent laws -- for the period roughly 1955-1965, the existence of the legislation itself was sufficient to attract black migration.

I. Introduction

The Great Migration was the largest internal migratory movement in American history and key in understanding the current distribution of black Americans across states and urban centers. Between 1910 and 1940, an estimated 1 million Southern blacks migrated into Northern states, with the majority choosing to reside in urban areas (Crew 1987). Migration waned during the Great Depression, but quickly regained momentum following the Second World War, and by 1970, the end of the Second Great Migration, the percentage of blacks residing somewhere other than their place of birth amounted to as high as 40-60%. Along with the traditional Northern destinations of the first wave of migration, the later migrants settled increasingly in Midwestern and Western cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).

The initial impetus for the latter migration is generally attributed to entry into World War II and the burgeoning demand for inexpensive labor in Northern- and Western-based defense industries. However, factors, especially non-economic factors, that sustained movement through the latter half of the 20th century remain relatively understudied, as the majority of research on the Great Migration focuses on the first phase. The studies that examine the 1940-70 period agree on the role of education and metropolitan destinations -- Curtis White et al (2005) finds that after controlling for personal characteristics and place-of-origin, black migrants were still 20-55% more likely than white migrants to reside in metropolitan areas in the North and Midwest, while Vidgor (2002) finds that higher levels of education were initially strong determinants of northern, urban migration decisions, but no longer in 1970.

So far the migration decision has been framed around the choice of regions and rural or urban life. However, states potentially represent a third layer in the choice of destination that the literature has yet to address, especially if states differed in policies that were of interest to migrants. One such policy would be prohibitions against discriminatory employment practices on the account of race, and the aim of this paper is to determine whether (and to what extent) state-level fair employment laws acted as determinants of black interstate migration after the initial demand shock of war industries wore off.

This paper finds fair employment laws passed in the middle of the 1945-1964 period were most attractive to black migrants -- between roughly 1955 to 1960, blacks were significantly more likely to migrate into fair employment states compared to all other periods. Before 1955, the laws held almost not significant predictive power; after 1960, their power waned in comparison to other factors, but did not disappear. In agreement with the Great Migration narrative, the laws were strong determinants of destination choice only for

respondents migrating from the South. For migration within the non-South, fair employment states were rarely selected at higher rates than non-fair employment states, even among black migrants.

The paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief overview of the history of fair employment laws. Section III reviews the relevant literature and discusses theoretical possibilities. Section IV presents data and variables. Section V presents the main empirical model, Section VI discusses the results, and Section VII presents alternate models. The final section concludes and suggests avenues for future research.

II. Fair Employment

Key dates in the history of fair employment legislation align well with key dates of the second migration. The first anti-discriminatory laws were signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 to enforce antidiscrimination policies in war industries and government. Executive order 8802 created a Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) with the power to review complaints of discrimination on basis of "race, creed, color and national origin" and intervene when necessary (Chen 2001, Collins 2001). The FEPC was controversial and politically tenuous -- indeed, Collins notes that it would have been politically unfeasible without the "imperatives of wartime economy" (2003). Its brief existence substantiates this claim. Dissolved then reformulated in 1943, the FEPC was dismantled immediately after the war that necessitated it ended. Between 1945 and the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 (which also coincides with the virtual end of migration), anti-discriminatory measures were left to the discretion of individual states (Collins 2001, Chen 2001).

The era of federal anti-discriminatory legislation began with the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. By the time the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968, 29 states had individually adopted fair employment laws, prohibiting discrimination in both public and private sectors of employment as well as labor organizations (Chen 2001). Of the 24 states that adopted the legislation before 1964, 22 included means of enforcement, such as independent committees or criminal punishment (Landes 1968). The states and years of passage are summarized below.

Table 1. States and Year of FE Adoption[1]

New Jersey	1945		Pennsylvania	1955
New York	1945		Colorado	1957
Massachusetts	1946		Wisconsin	1957
Connecticut	1947		California	1959
New Mexico	1949		Ohio	1959
Oregon	1949		Delaware	1960
Rhode Island	1949		Illinois	1961
Washington	1949		Kansas	1961
Michigan	1955		Missouri	1961
Minnesota	1955		Indiana	1963

Interestingly, while the laws remained fairly standard from state to state (as they were all modelled after the first New York laws), their passage across states followed no obvious geographic pattern except in the South, where the few states that enacted them were either among the last to do so or did not include means of enforcement (Landes 1968). In non-Southern states, passage was led by a cluster of northeastern states (New York, New Jersey,

[1] I only include states that adopted before 1964 and included means of enforcement. Hawaii and Alaska are excluded because of lack of data, for a total of 20 fair employment states in the contiguous US.

Massachusetts, Connecticut), but spread to the West, Midwest, and the rest of the Northeast in a seemingly random pattern -- for example, faraway New Mexico and Washington both enacted fair employment in 1949 while Pennsylvania, though adjacent to New York, did not do so until 1955 (Landes 1968, Collins 2000). This lack of discernable geographic pattern as well as its relevance for black migrants makes state fair employment legislation a plausible determinant of black interstate migration and an ideal vehicle through which to examine, more generally, the effect of differential state policies on internal movement.

III. Literature

Although the literature on state anti-discriminatory measures is limited, there has been some empirical investigation into the economic outcomes of fair employment laws, and this offers some indication of the political economy implications of passage. Landes (1968), in the first empirical study of the impact of state fair employment laws, finds mixed evidence of success. He finds that the wage differential between non-white and white males was about 5% lower in states with fair employment laws than in those without, but that some of this gain could be attributed to increases in the unemployment differential compared to non-fair employment states. Collins's (2003) more nuanced study finds that the earliest fair employment laws (defined as adoption between 1940 and 1950) improved the relative income of black workers relative to white without worsening employment outcomes; however, later laws (passed between 1950 and 1960) did not have any effect on either outcome for black men, confirming Landes's findings.

Collins (2000) and Chen (2001) also investigate the determinants of passage across states, finding that states with more competitive political systems or strong Democratic control were more likely to adopt anti-discrimination laws, while the size of black population is

insignificant in Collins's study and negatively correlated in Chen's. The implications of these findings will inform my later discussion of possible correlations between fair employment laws and black migration. Collins also finds that cooperation between auxiliary groups, such as labor unions and the Jewish population, are significant determinants of passage, and Chen finds that the laws were more likely to pass in wealthier states where black and other minority workers were less likely to be perceived as job market competitors.

To my knowledge, however, no previous study has examined the potential of fair employment laws as a migration determinant with the exception of Collins (2003), who includes a small section on migration in his larger study of labor market outcomes. Collins finds that fair employment laws have no significant impact on black migration. Although forming the basis of my model, Collins's migration model, being a brief aside of a different study, does not fully capture the nuances of fair employment legislation.

There is, however, sizeable literature on the effects of state policies on internal migration. The Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis, which introduced the concept of "voting with one's feet" into the migration and policy literatures, suggests that "consumer-voters" with perfect mobility choose residences based on the bundle of local amenities that best satisfies his or her preferences (Tiebout 1956; Tullock 1971). The traditional focus on government expenditure (specifically the ratio of investment to consumer spending) as an attraction or deterrent has received considerable empirical support (Cebula 1974; Cebula 2002; Preuhs 1999), and more recent extensions of the model have examined the migratory power of individual policies, some with less obvious economic implications. Researchers have found interstate migration to be significantly affected by differential Medicaid benefits (Cebula and Clark 2012), welfare policies (De Jong et al 2005), and overall state ideology, independent of current fiscal policy

(Preuhs 1999). The last study also finds greater in-migration for states with lower median income, challenging traditional view of migration determinants.

In a non-US context, Narayana (1990) finds support for Tiebout's hypothesis, finding that tax and federal transfer policies are important determinants of inter-regional migration in India; Liang and White (1997) find evidence that the strength and prevalence of government-sponsored rural enterprises in Chinese provinces creates a "multiphasic" migration response, initially reducing out-migration, then inducing it. Most relevant is Chitose's (2003) Malaysian study, which finds that affirmative action policies favoring the predominantly rural and low-income ethnic Malays led to greater migration to urban areas for at least some Malays.

This paper is thus motivated by two previously unrelated bodies of literature -- that of Great Migration-era fair employment and Tiebout-based analyses of interstate migration.

It is difficult to predict a priori the migration effects of fair employment laws. The previous literature, especially those concerned with the determinants of their passage, gives rise to a number of contradictory scenarios. Intuitively, it would seem that the promise of fair employment would mean greater potential gains for blacks compared to states without such laws. This would induce a pattern of black out-migration from non-fair employment states into fair employment states. This assumes, however, the the laws are effective (or are at least perceived to be effective) in enforcing non-discrimination, when in fact it is not obvious that this is the case (Landes 1968; Collins 2003).

However, it is not obvious that the passage of fair employment legislation is exogenous to the overall political and cultural landscape of individual states, which in itself acts as a determinant of migration. Donohue and Heckman (1991) note that it is difficult to isolate the effect of legislation on economic progress when legislation is a product of social forces that

themselves affect economic change. Although their study is focused on federal legislation, their concerns remain valid for state legislation. It is possible that fair employment laws signal nothing new if states that enact them are already the most hospitable to minorities and are already the locations of greatest economic gain. In that case, fair employment laws by themselves provide no new information about the relative attractiveness of destination states. We would expect their effect on in-migration to be nil after controlling for other state characteristics (or to exhibit a positive bias if characteristics are not properly accounted for).

Along the same lines, the source of party power could determine the importance of fair employment legislation in of itself. Collins (2001) notes that party power is likely to be endogenously determined, so the passage of anti-discriminatory laws gives migrants no more incentive to choose Democrat-controlled destination states than before. On the other hand, if fair employment is a "small issue in a big political pond," then it is possible that power is determined by issues exogenous to fair employment. In this case, fair employment would become a real distinguishing factor between destination states.

Within the legislative process, political maneuvering that induces or hinders passage may muddle any potential signals and obscure the direction of popular support (Collins 2003). Political factors that could determine the likelihood of passage include the level of competition between political parties, the extent to which passage or non-passage could be used to appeal to a politically significant group, the number of other pieces of legislation under consideration, and how fair employment measures up in terms of importance.

If fair employment laws hold symbolic meaning for some groups, governments in competitive states may use passage or non-passage to appease potentially oppositional groups while maintaining the effective status quo -- as noted before, Chen (2001) and Collins (2000)

both find that states with more party competition are more likely to pass the legislation, though of course this does not necessarily indicate anything about the effectiveness of the law passed.

Furthermore, state representatives voting along national party lines might not represent perfectly the beliefs and attitudes of the voting public; especially in states with greater diversity, political opinions could differ wildly depending on district. If, for example, fair employment does not pass in a state that contains concentrated, geographic support for the laws, then that state might still experience in-migration specifically to those regions despite what the lack of fair employment laws signals about the rest of the state. Numerous competing political interests might prevent passage in states that are observationally similar to other fair employment states.

If there are enough such "disturbances" in the logic of fair employment enactment, then passage would be essentially randomized in the eyes of would-be migrants. The laws would lose all signalling power, and migration decisions would be based on individual characteristics and more general state characteristics. In an empirical study, we would expect to find, after controlling for these variables, that fair employment legislation is uncorrelated with in-migration.

The final case to consider is one in which legislation is seen as a last resort, and fair employment laws were enacted by states with the most obvious and quantifiable patterns of employment discrimination or decline in black economic outcomes. Collins (2003) proposes this as a possibility, and Landes (1968) provides some empirical evidence for this line of thinking. In such a case, where non-discriminatory measures are passed by those that need it most, the laws may in fact signal poor economic and non-economic options for minorities. They would be negatively correlated with in-migration.

Theoretically, therefore, the effect of fair employment legislation on black interstate migration could be positive, negative, or negligible, depending on the strength of its signal and

how its passage relates to political processes and preexisting state conditions. The question becomes an empirical one.

IV. Data and Variables

Unlike the majority of previous researchers of the Great Migration, the present specification does not rely on gross or net migration. Because traditional models of migration such as those laid out by Sjaastad (1962) model migration decisions as functions of individual-level cost-benefit analysis, I include microdata for a more comprehensive analysis of migration determinants. Additionally, the strong literature in support of the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis indicates that state-level variables should be used in conjunction with individual-level data for the most comprehensive results. Therefore, I include a combination of individual, destination state, and origin state characteristics in my analysis.[2]

My data comes from IPUMS USA census samples for years 1940-70. The sample used here contains native-born black and white men between the ages of 18 and 65 who are heads of household. This specification minimizes the risk of migrants moving for any reason other than perceived economic gain -- for schooling, institutionalization, marriage, or following the head of household. Foreign-born respondents are excluded because immigrants might encounter different patterns of discrimination or nondiscrimination or respond to migration incentives differently than native-born Americans. Each year contains data on individual and current residence characteristics; with the exception of 1960, each year also contains information on the respondent's previous residence.

[2] This is not to imply, of course, that the macro-level approach is in any way inferior. As Hendrix (1975) finds, "The macro-level data show a "rational" pattern of migrant dispersion. However, the micro-level data show an extensive tendency...to follow the paths of siblings and other kin…" Macro- and micro-level data can be used in conjunction to capture different aspects of the migration decision.

The key dependent variable is formulated from the five-year migration question first introduced in 1940. It is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in interstate migration in the past five years, taking a 0 if not. For 1950 only, the migration question is based on movements only one year ago, so in this case the variable *interstate* takes a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in interstate migration within the last year.

My key explanatory variables are race (variable name *Black* that takes a value of 1 when the respondent is black and 0 when he is white), year, and fair employment. Fair employment is specified first as an indicator and then as continuous variable of years since adoption. I will return to a more detailed discussion of these variables when I discuss my specification after a brief overview of the control variables.

Individual controls are included with Sjaastad's rationale in mind. Age and marital status should both be negatively correlated with migration, so marital status is included as an indicator variable and age is entered as a continuous term and again squared. Higher skilled individuals can expect greater returns with migration and may be better equipped to bear relocation costs; on the other hand, those with lower wages have more to gain (or less to lose) by migrating. Whatever the relationship between income and propensity for migration, it is likely to be nonlinear. Wage and salary income is therefore added in log form. Also included are educational attainment (divided into none, primary, secondary, and post-secondary education) and an occupational prestige score (a continuous variable from 0 to 80, constructed using median income for each occupation) to proxy for skill level. Current employment status (captured by employed, unemployed, and not in labor force variables) capture job market motivations for migration.

Because farmers (in this case differentiated from farm laborers) are a significant group (approximately 16% of whites and 25% of blacks in 1940), but are relatively immobile and are technically self-employed (therefore reporting zero values in wage and salary income questions), an indicator variable for farmers is included. And since previous literature has emphasized the attractiveness of cities to migrants, regardless of the location of the city, an indicator for current residence in an urban area is included to account for metropolitan pulls in the migration decision.

Because the census does not report previous measures for individual characteristics, caution should be taken in interpreting them as determinants of migration. While age, education, and perhaps marital status can be taken as exogenous, the other individual controls face endogeneity issues when specified with current-period figures. Coefficients on employment status, wage income, occupational prestige and urban residence thus represent the correlation between past migration and current period characteristics and not the causal link between past characteristics and the migration decision. In some cases, however, such as urban residence, it may be possible to use current status to extrapolate past decisions.

State controls are drawn from various census publications and include lagged ratios of per capita income, unemployment rate, and percent of population black between current and previous state. These are calculated as current state rates divided by previous state rates; for non-migrants, then, each of the ratios equals one. Per capita income (lagged five years) and unemployment rate (lagged ten years) are included with the assumption that migrants of all races are attracted to states where they have perceived greater economic opportunities.

Percent black is assumed to only strongly affect black migration decisions. Previous literature has demonstrated the importance of network ties in migration decisions and a large black population can indicate familiarity (thus lowering noneconomic costs of relocation) or a

strong social safety net and established social and political institutions that make the area more attractive to new black arrivals. At the same time, however, if occupations were tightly segregated by race for men, as there is some reason to believe (Collins 2003), a large black population could indicate fewer employment options for black migrants. Furthermore, there is some evidence (Collins 2000; Chen 2001) that larger minority populations represent greater job market competition with the majority and therefore result in more severe discrimination. Depending on the severity of occupational segregation, these factors could temper the attractiveness of network ties and strong race-based institutions.

Because the 1960 data does not report state of residence one or five years ago, all state ratios for that year are calculated using state of birth. While an imperfect measure, the correlation between interstate migration and lifetime migration (counted if birth and current state are different) if fairly high in 1960. Nonetheless, some caution should be used in interpreting these results.

I also include an indicator *South* which reports whether or not previous state (and current state for non-migrants) was in the South, as defined by the census' broad geographic categories. This captures any differential propensities to migrate depending on residence in the South versus non-South. Another indicator reports whether or not previous state had enforceable fair employment laws. This measure should be negatively correlated with interstate migration if fair employment is perceived as attractive, and positively correlated if the laws are perceived as unattractive, either in their policy intentions or what their passage indicates about the state's current conditions.

Variable definitions are reported in Table 2, and summary statistics in Table 3.

Table 2. Variable Definitions

Interstate	Indicates short-term interstate migration; takes value of 1 if respondent participated in interstate migration 1 or 5 years previously, 0 if not
Lifetime	Indicates lifetime migration; value of 1 if respondent's birth and current states are different, 0 if same
FE, Specifications 1& 2	Indicates whether current state adopted FE laws during the migration period in question (1935-1949 for 1940/50, 1950-1955 for 1950/60, 1956-1965 for 1960/70)
FE, Specifications 3-5	Years since current state adopted FE laws, 0 if state does not have the laws in place
Black	Indicates respondent's race; 1 if black, 0 if white
Year	Census year observed
Wage	Wage and salary income
Occupational score	Prestige score based on ranking of each occupation's median wage and salary income (1-80)
Age	Age
Urban resident	Indicates current urban residence
Employed	Indicates current employment
Unemployed	Indicates current unemployment
Not in labor force	Indicates currently not in labor force
No education	Indicates respondent has no formal education
Primary level education	Indicates primary education is highest level of education attained
Secondary education	Secondary education is highest level attained
Post-secondary education	Post-secondary (and beyond) is highest level attained
Farmer	Indicates current farmer status
Marital status	Indicates respondent is currently married
Previous residence in FE state	Indicates previous state that currently has FE laws in place
Black population ratio (Interstate)	Ratio of black population of current state to previous state, lagged 10 years
Black population ratio (Lifetime)	Ratio of black population of current state to birth state, lagged 10 years
Per capita income ratio (Interstate)	Ratio of per capita income of current state to previous state, lagged 5 years
Per capita income ratio (Lifetime)	Ratio of per capita income of current state to birth state, lagged 5 years
Unemployment ratio (Interstate)	Ratio of unemployment rate of current state to previous state, lagged 10 years
Unemployment ratio (Lifetime)	Ratio of unemployment rate of current state to previous state, lagged 10 years
Previous residence in Southern state	Indicates previous state that is located in census categorized South

Table 3. Summary Statistics, by race and year

	1940		**1950**		**1960**		**1970**	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Individual Characteristics								
Age	41.58	40.76	42.00	42.16	42.55	42.39	41.93	41.16
Wage	1131	485.3	2415	1266	4549	2319	7831	4341
Occupational score	24.72	17.08	24.89	16.03	27.29	17.89	28.14	20.22
Urban residence	0.496	0.404	0.567	0.557	0.681	0.733	0.699	0.663
No education	0.0116	0.0962	0.00537	0.0418	0.00378	0.0305	0.00266	0.0128
Primary education	0.720	0.848	0.403	0.721	0.289	0.556	0.162	0.338
Secondary education	0.205	0.0427	0.305	0.0909	0.374	0.176	0.470	0.326
Post-secondary education	0.0635	0.0131	0.0840	0.0167	0.117	0.0303	0.181	0.0507
Employed	0.905	0.886	0.887	0.803	0.893	0.783	0.881	0.764
Unemployed	0.0511	0.0662	0.0237	0.0464	0.0295	0.0584	0.0220	0.0359
Not in labor force	0.0443	0.0480	0.0891	0.150	0.0779	0.159	0.0966	0.200
Farmer	0.161	0.251	0.0945	0.123	0.0292	0.0279	0.0172	0.00544
State Characteristics								
Residence in FE state	0	0	0.198	0.0903	0.565	0.362	0.343	0.316
Previous residence in FE state	0	0	0.656	0.377	0.659	0.178	0.696	0.553
Previous residence in South	0.291	0.761	0.283	0.652	0.296	0.855	0.262	0.451
Migration								
Interstate migrant	0.0872	0.0472	0.0334	0.0448	0.381	0.530	0.204	0.161
Lifetime migrant	0.318	0.328	0.333	0.440	0.362	0.523	0.413	0.517

It is reassuring to see that the data generally follows expected patterns. Blacks begin the period predominantly in the South, with 76% residing in the region in 1935 (versus 29% of whites). By 1965, that figure has fallen to 45% and 26%, respectively. Urban residence for both groups increases with year, from 40% for blacks in 1940 (50% for whites) to 66% (70%) in 1970. Although blacks begin the period more likely to be farmers (25% to 16%), they are less likely in 1970 (0.5% to 1.7%). Black occupational prestige scores also lag consistently 7-8 points below those of whites, and at every year blacks are more likely to be unemployed or not in the labor force.

Of most interest for this paper are the statistics on migration and residence in fair employment (FE) states. In 1940, migration does not seem to differ by race. In 1950 and 1960, the key decades in FE adoption, blacks are substantially more likely to have migrated one or five years previously. By 1970, however, their likelihood of interstate migration has fallen below that of the white population, though they remain lifetime migrants at higher rates. This pattern conforms to the established by previous research into the Great Migration -- by 1970, most sources agree, migration has slowed to a trickle.

Also interesting are the figures associated with residence in fair employment states. For years 1950 and 1960, blacks are less likely (and increasingly less likely) to reside in such states, with the gap growing from 10-percentage points to 20 between 1950 and 1960. Only in 1970, six years after the Civil Rights Act was enacted at a federal level, do black and white figures reach similar levels, and then only because the white likelihood of fair employment residence falls by some 20 percentage points. This seems to confirm Collins's (2003) migration analysis and begs the question: Did fair employment laws in fact signal an unattractive state for black migrants?

V. Model Specification

My model specification (Specification 1) is an extension of Collins's (2003) difference-in-difference-in-difference model. Each of the three regressions pools two years (1940-1950, 1950-1960, 1960-70), which allows us to observe whether the effects of FE changes over the course of each decade. Each regression takes the following form:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 Black + \beta_2 FE + \beta_3 Year + \beta_4 (Black\ x\ FE) + \beta_5 (Black\ x\ Year) + \beta_6 (Year\ x\ FE) + \beta_7 (Black\ x\ Year\ x\ FE) + \beta_8 X + \beta_9 N, \text{ where}$$

Y is the probability of interstate migration within the past five (or one) years, *Black* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is black and 0 if not, *FE* indicates states that adopted fair employment legislation during the period in question, and *Year* indicates the latter year. *X* and *N* are vectors of the individual and state controls described above. By specifying *FE* as only the states that adopted during the period in question, this model allows for the observation of the immediate impact of adoption on migration. If the laws gain or lose predictive power over time, it is not captured in this model. Alternate specifications that capture time effects will be presented in the following sections.[3]

Race, state policy (fair employment), and year are the three dimensions of analysis. β4, the coefficient on the interaction between race and fair employment, captures the probability that a black resident of a fair employment state had migrated into it in the past one or five years;β5 captures the change in the probability of black migration from the beginning of one decade to the end; β6 captures the change in migration (regardless of race) into FE states during the decade. The coefficients of most interest are the ones that capture race and FE, β4and β7, which captures the change of race and fair employment as determinants of interstate migration between the beginning and end of one decade. β7 thus allows β4 to be compared across all decades, while the coefficients on β4itself capture the pooled values of the year-pair and may obscure distinct patterns of each census year.

Results of the key coefficients are reported in Table 3, first without any controls, then with individual controls, and finally with state controls as well. Estimates for controls are reported in Appendix A.

[3] The more intuitive method of specifying FE as any state with the law in place, regardless of year of passage, is not used in this case because this specification is designed to capture the impact of adoption on migration -- that is, how migrants responded to each "wave" of legislation. The effects of time on FE are explored in alternate specifications.

VI. Results

For all year-pairs, each addition of controls lowers the magnitude of the FE and race coefficients, though the majority of key coefficients remain significant throughout. As predicted, interstate migration is determined by a combination of individual characteristics, state characteristics, and fair employment policies. The negative coefficients on Black x FE, the interaction between race and FE enactment, for 1940/50 and 1950/60 agree with Collins's (2003) finding and the mixed results that Landes (1968) found concerning their effectiveness. However, the positive (and greater) coefficient for 1960/70 indicates that laws passed in later years were perceived as more effective. One possibility is that they were actually more effective; another is that whatever positive outcomes the earlier laws produced did not become apparent until a decade or two after passage, thus transforming the perception of fair employment laws as the years passed.

The pattern can be more adequately explained by examining the Black x Year x FE interaction for all year-pairs. The coefficients suggest an especially unresponsive black migrant population in 1950 and an especially active one in 1960. The coefficient on the triple interaction for 1940/50 is insignificant, meaning that black migration into FE states was no different in 1950 compared to 1940, when there were *no* FE states. Yet the positive and significant coefficient on the Black x 1950 interaction indicates that blacks were overall *more* mobile in 1950 compared to 1940. Given that the migration question in 1940 captures the end of the depression decade, this further underscores the failure of the laws passed in the earliest period to attract black migrants -- even with substantially increased migration numbers, black migrants in 1950 were no more likely to choose FE states compared to any other state. Furthermore, when comparing the Black x Year interaction across year-pairs, it seems that blacks were the most mobile in 1950 compared

to all other years in the sample. Yet, compared to the later decades, they exhibited significantly less preference for FE destinations.

The most likely possibility is that the laws passed in the earliest period held little predictive power concerning black outcomes. It should be noted that without any controls, the coefficient on the triple interaction for 1940/50 is positive and significant. This suggests that black migrants were unresponsive to the earliest laws because, as proposed in Section III, the first FE laws were enacted by states that were already natural destination states. Therefore, in 1950, the laws signaled nothing new and did not induce in-migration.

Judging by the positive and negative coefficients on the triple interaction for 1950/60 and 1960/70, respectively, the years leading up to 1960 were the key years for FE-induced in-migration. This makes sense if the states that adopted after the initial wave were the ones that "needed" it most. A decline after 1960 also makes sense. Any state that did not pass anti-discriminatory laws until four years before it was instituted at the federal level was probably one that did not pass it with a large or willing majority -- that is, there must have been enough internal opposition to block its passage for this long, and that substantial opposition surely would not have signaled large gains for black migrants.[4]

[4] It should be noted that overall migration figures agree with macroeconomic trends of this period. The post-war boom beginning in the 1950s increased the ability of blacks and whites alike to migrate; likewise, it is not difficult to imagine that as the boom tapered off, coinciding with the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it brought about a slowdown in migration. However, there is no reason of which I am aware that these macroeconomic and geopolitical trends should affect black and white migration patterns differently. Therefore, my discussion does not take these factors into account.

Table 3. Regression results for Specification 1, FE on interstate migration

Interstate migrant	(1) 1940/50, no controls	Individual controls	All controls	(2) 1950/60, no controls	Individual controls	All controls	(3) 1960/70, no controls	Individual controls	All controls
Black	-0.0284***	-0.0288***	-0.0550***	0.0107*	0.0384***	0.0281***	0.113***	0.144***	0.0154***
	(0.00183)	(0.00241)	(0.00291)	(0.00525)	(0.00624)	(0.00591)	(0.00268)	(0.00328)	(0.00333)
FE enacted	0.0702***	0.0614***	0.0673***	-0.0279***	-0.0417***	-0.0228***	-0.0486***	-0.0422***	-0.00188
	(0.00143)	(0.00171)	(0.00156)	(0.00321)	(0.00370)	(0.00334)	(0.00226)	(0.00267)	(0.00246)
Year	-0.0361***	-0.0506***	-0.0301***	0.317***	0.299***	0.267***	-0.178***	0.552***	0.586***
	(0.00113)	(0.00161)	(0.00144)	(0.00203)	(0.00246)	(0.00218)	(0.00116)	(0.00313)	(0.00281)
Black x FE	-0.0449***	-0.0313***	-0.0437***	-0.0220	-0.0563***	-0.0311*	0.278***	0.238***	0.0980***
	(0.00748)	(0.00850)	(0.00761)	(0.0128)	(0.0146)	(0.0128)	(0.00752)	(0.00876)	(0.00815)
Black x Year	0.0389***	0.0556***	0.0578***	0.0785***	0.0736***	-0.0589***	-0.155***	-0.116***	-0.0925***
	(0.00342)	(0.00421)	(0.00376)	(0.00596)	(0.00694)	(0.00623)	(0.00365)	(0.0117)	(0.0108)
Year x FE	-0.0944***	-0.0843***	-0.0850***	0.0930***	0.0941***	-0.0381***	-0.000728	0.0463***	0.0160*
	(0.00258)	(0.00301)	(0.00269)	(0.00362)	(0.00412)	(0.00368)	(0.00308)	(0.00860)	(0.00766)
Black x Year x FE	0.0264*	0.00338	0.0195	0.330***	0.341***	0.146***	-0.289***	-0.236***	-0.113***
	(0.0120)	(0.0138)	(0.0123)	(0.0141)	(0.0160)	(0.0142)	(0.0102)	(0.0323)	(0.0289)
Constant	0.0743***			0.0420***			0.388***		
	(0.000614)			(0.00178)			(0.000857)		
N	322630			432232			738555		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The story for state characteristics confounding FE signals is even more compelling when the model is respecified to include only non-South states. In this specification (Specification 2), all respondents with current or previous states in the census-designated South are omitted, so that observation of the migration decision is restricted to movement within the non-South. Estimates for key coefficients are reported in Table 4; controls can again be found in Appendix A.

Though the triple interaction term for 1940/50 is positive, the negative Black x FE term for the pooled 1940-50 period simply means that black migration into FE states was more likely in 1950 compared to 1940, and does not necessarily mean that it was positive in 1950. However, it would make sense that if the earliest laws elicited any migration response, it would be from migrants from nearby states, who had the smallest relocation costs to incur and the least to lose should the laws prove to be disappointing for outcomes. The insignificant estimates for both Black x FE and the triple term for both later year-pairs confirm the overall unresponsiveness. It would seem that if FE states received migrants disproportionately, it was due to an influx from the South; interstate migration in the non-South, except perhaps in the first years of passage, was not influenced by the existence of FE law.

Table 4. Regression results for Specification 2, non-South states

Interstate migration, excluding South	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1940/50	1950/60	1960/70
Black	-0.0207**	-0.00533	0.000319
	(0.00775)	(0.0102)	(0.00758)
FE enacted	0.0716***	-0.00208	0.00623*
	(0.00146)	(0.00335)	(0.00252)
Year	-0.0401***	0.225***	0.638***
	(0.00161)	(0.00262)	(0.00377)
Black x FE	-0.0686***	0.00263	0.0130
	(0.00781)	(0.0146)	(0.0149)
Black x Year	0.0156*	-0.00704	0.0313
	(0.00634)	(0.0124)	(0.0191)
Year x FE	-0.0706***	-0.0223***	0.0481***
	(0.00256)	(0.00377)	(0.00906)
Black x Year x FE	0.0643***	0.00619	0.0277
	(0.0124)	(0.0188)	(0.0462)

VII. Alternate Specifications

The previous specification captures the effect of fair employment immediately or a few years after enactment, but it could be useful to examine its longer-term effects. As Landes (1968) observes, the power of fair employment laws could change with time. To better capture this time dimension, *FE* is respecified to mean years since adoption for a given year and takes a zero for states without fair employment laws (Specification 3). Because this specification prevents pooling over years, the model is estimated first using individual year cross-sections and then by pooling all years. All year dummies are eliminated. For the 1970 estimation, STATA omits individual and state controls, so it should be noted that for that year cross-section no controls were included. Otherwise, controls are reported in Appendix A.

The time dimension can also be captured by examining the relationship between fair employment and lifetime migration (Specification 4). Again, *FE* is specified as years since adoption (zero for states without), and regressions are run for individual year cross-sections. The dependent variable, *lifetime*, indicates whether birth state is different from current state. State controls, specified as ratios of current state to birth state, are included, though they should be taken with a grain of salt, since it is unlikely for repeat migrants that birth state conditions play a significant role in decision making after the initial migration.

This specification does not necessarily reveal any new information in 1950, when the oldest fair employment legislation is just five years old, other than perhaps a propensity for migration that is difficult to capture otherwise. In later years, however, it could reveal the relative change in strength of fair employment laws as migration determinants. As time goes on, the power of fair employment laws in affecting migration becomes less about signals and more about their observable effects. The longer the laws were around, the better information available to migrants concerning their effectiveness. The probability of lifetime migration into an FE state could be greater or less than the initial interstate migration, depending on the new information provided. Key coefficients are presented in Table 5; estimates on controls can again be found in Appendix A.

In specifying *FE* as years since adoption, the model reveals the preferences of migrants for older versus newer laws. However, attitudes toward fair employment laws in general are also subject to change with time. A final *lifetime* model pools all years and specifies *FE* as an indicator of whether or not current state possesses fair employment laws, regardless of year of passage (Specification 5). This specification reveals not the effect of differences between older and newer laws, but how the importance of having such laws at all changes (or does not change)

in migrants' valuations of destination states. Key results are presented in Table 6, and controls in Appendix A.

Besides the very small coefficients for 1970 and "all years," none of the coefficients on the interaction term are significant for the short-term interstate migration models (1-4) in Table 5. This coupled with the much larger and significant coefficients on black migration suggests that whatever deterministic power FE laws had at passage depreciated quickly -- black migrants exhibited no preference for older laws. The lifetime migration models (5-7) confirm this. Aside from a somewhat larger negative coefficient for 1950, the interaction term for later years is insignificant. Thus the age of FE laws had no predictive power over black migration decisions in either the short-term or the long-term. It is also interesting that the coefficient on *Years Since* by itself is significantly negative for almost all specifications, indicating that migrants as a group avoided states with the oldest FE laws.

The estimates for the triple interactions in the final pooled lifetime migration model (Table 6) agree with the earlier findings on short-term migration (Table 3) in that FE laws seemed to have the greatest attraction for black migrants in the years leading up to 1960. Once again its power fades in 1970, but remains greater than it was in 1950, despite the negative probabilities of black migration for both later years. It makes sense that any effect on interstate migration is echoed in lifetime migration, especially in 1960, the year with the highest correlation between the two types of migration. Furthermore, this indicates that though the draw of individual state laws may fade with time, the draw for FE laws in general remains strong in the later years. Although blacks were less likely to have participated in both short-term and lifetime interstate migration in 1960 and 1970 compared to 1950, they expressed significantly greater interest in FE states when they did.

Table 5. Regression results for years since enactment on interstate (Specification 3) and lifetime migration (Specification 4)

Interstate migrant	(1) 1950	(2) 1960	(3) 1970	(4) All years	Lifetime migrant	(5) 1950	(6) 1960	(7) 1970
Black	0.221**	-0.0195**	0.0332***	0.0881***		-0.0729	-0.0117	-0.0863**
	(0.0675)	(0.00701)	(0.00524)	(0.00851)		(0.0735)	(0.00648)	(0.0291)
Years since enactment	-0.00380***	-0.00234***	-0.00149***	-0.00326***		-0.0840***	-0.00225***	0.000524
	(0.000591)	(0.000178)	(0.0000865)	(0.000125)		(0.00219)	(0.000171)	(0.000475)
Black x years since	0.00283	0.000947	0.00438***	-0.00334***		-0.0315*	0.000315	0.000457
	(0.00416)	(0.000659)	(0.000306)	(0.000481)		(0.0153)	(0.000614)	(0.00172)

Table 6. Regression results for Specification 5, FE on lifetime migration

Lifetime migrant	All years		
Black	-0.0220***	Black x FE x 1970	0.0950***
	(0.00567)		(0.0215)
FE	-0.251***	FE x 1960	-0.0731***
	(0.00425)		(0.00386)
1960	0.0253***	FE x 1970	-0.0524***
	(0.00329)		(0.00619)
1970	0.410***	Black x 1960	-0.0528***
	(0.00501)		(0.00663)
Black x FE x 1960	0.205***	Black x 1970	-0.183***
	(0.00550)		(0.0190)

VIII. Conclusion

The passage of state-level fair employment laws between 1945 and 1963 coincided with the second phase of the Great Migration of black Americans. Did these laws play a role in shaping migration? If so, in what way and to what extent were migration decisions dependent upon them? Theoretical predictions are mixed, and largely depend upon individual and state characteristics as well. Using IPUMS Census samples for years 1940-1970, I model interstate and lifetime migration as a function of existence of fair employment laws and years since passage, controlling for individual and state (both previous and current) characteristics.

I find that fair employment laws passed in the middle of the period hold the greatest attractive power for black migrants. Before 1960, the laws did not appear to factor into migration decisions except when migration is limited to the non-South; afterwards, they remained attractive, but declined in importance compared to other factors. As expected, their predicting power is greatest when all possible sending and receiving states are considered; when the sample is reduced to the non-South, fair employment loses most of its influence on black migration. Furthermore, though the existence of FE laws held predicting power for the entirety of the later periods, there is no evidence that the older laws were more attractive. For the period roughly 1955-1965, taking into account the whole of the contiguous US, the existence of the laws was enough to induce in-migration. Thus fair employment laws were at least partially successful in signaling, particularly to Southern migrants, the attractiveness of the state.

The models used in this paper assume that fair employment laws were the only state policy to induce racially differentiated migration decisions. In fact, there are numerous state policies that could affect black and white migrants differently. Furthermore, although blacks were the most visible face of civil rights movements, there remain other ethnic and religious

minorities that were equally affected by laws such as fair employment. Future research should address how other minorities responded to fair employment and other policies.

References

Cebula, Richard and Jeff Clark. "An Extension of the Tiebout Hypothesis of Voting with One's Feet: The Medicaid Magnet Hypothesis" Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 52431 (2012).

Cebula, Richard J. "Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis Revisited" *The Review of Regional Studies* 32.1 (2002): 87-96.

Chen, Anthony S. "The Passage of State Fair Employment Legislation, 1945-1964: An Event-History Analysis with Time-Varying and Time-Constant Covariates." Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. 79-01 (2001).

Chitose, Yoshimi. "Effects of Government Policy on Internal Migration in Peninsular Malaysia: A Comparison between Malays and Non-Malays" *International Migration Review* 37.4 (2003): 1191-1219.

Collins, William J. "The Political Economy of Race, 1940-1964: The Adoption of State-Level Fair Employment Legislation" NBER Working Paper, Historical Paper No. 128 (2000).

Collins, William J. "The Labor Market Impact of State-Level Anti-Discrimination Laws, 1940-1960. "*Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 56.2 (2003): 244-272.

Crew, Spencer R. "The Great Migration of Afro-Americans, 1915-40." *Monthly Labor Review* 110.3 (1987): 34-36.

Curtis White, Katherine J., Kyle Crowder, Stewart E. Tolnay and Robert M. Adelman. "Race, Gender, and Marriage: Destination Selection during the Great Migration" *Demography* 42.2 (2005): 215-241.

De Jong, Gordon F., Deborah Roempke Graefe and Tanja St. Pierre. "Welfare Reform and Interstate Migration of Poor Families" *Demography* 42.3 (2005): 469-496.

Donohue III, John J. and James Heckman, "Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks." *Journal of Economic Literature* 29.4 (1991): 1603-1643.

Hendrix, Lewellyn. "Kinship and Economic-Rational Migration: A Comparison of Micro- and Macro-Level Analyses." *The Sociological Quarterly* 16.4 (1975): 534-543.

Landes, William M. "The Economics of Fair Employment Laws." *The Journal of Political Economy* 76.4 (1968): 507-552.

Liang, Z and Michael J. White. "Market Transition, Government Policies, and Interprovincial Migration in China: 1983-1988" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 45.2 (1997): 321-339.

Mbatia, O.L.E. “The Economic Effects of Fair Employment Laws on Occupations: The Application of Information Theory to Evaluate Progress of Black Americans, 1954-1972.” *Journal of Black Studies* 8.3 (1978): 259-278.

Narayana. M. R. “Policy and Non-Policy Economic Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration of Workers in a Developing Country: Some New Evidence Based on a Polytomous Logit Model for India.” *Population Research and Policy Review* 9.3 (1990): 285-302.

Preuhs, Robert R. “State Policy Components of Interstate Migration in the United States” *Political Research Quarterly* 52.3 (1999): 527-549.

Sjaastad, Larry A. “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration.” *Journal of Political Economy* 70.5 (1962): 80-93.

Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0* [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.

Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” *The Journal of Political Economy* 64.5 (1956): 416-424.

Vigdor, Jacob L. “The Pursuit of Opportunity: Explaining Selective Black Migration” *Journal of Urban Economics* 51 (2002): 391-417.

Appendix A

Table A1. Complete regression results Specification 1

	(1) Interstate migrant 1940/50	(2) Interstate migrant 1950/60	(3) Interstate migrant 1960/70
Black	-0.0550***	0.0281***	0.0154***
	(0.00291)	(0.00591)	(0.00333)
FE enacted	0.0673***	-0.0228***	-0.00188
	(0.00156)	(0.00334)	(0.00246)
Year	-0.0301***	0.267***	0.586***
	(0.00144)	(0.00218)	(0.00281)
Black x FE	-0.0437***	-0.0311*	0.0980***
	(0.00761)	(0.0128)	(0.00815)
Black x Year	0.0578***	-0.0589***	-0.0925***
	(0.00376)	(0.00623)	(0.0108)
Year x FE	-0.0850***	-0.0381***	0.0160*
	(0.00269)	(0.00368)	(0.00766)
Black x Year x FE	0.0195	0.146***	-0.113***
	(0.0123)	(0.0142)	(0.0289)
Wage	0.00140*	0.00921***	0.0115***
	(0.000685)	(0.00103)	(0.00117)
Occupational score	0.0000871	-0.000830***	-0.000961***
	(0.0000630)	(0.0000767)	(0.0000841)
Age	-0.00265***	-0.00291***	-0.00236***
	(0.000317)	(0.000419)	(0.000466)
Age squared	0.0000165***	0.0000345***	0.0000325***
	(0.00000374)	(0.00000492)	(0.00000551)
Urban residence	-0.0149***	0.0384***	0.0568***
	(0.00109)	(0.00153)	(0.00171)
Employed	-0.0147***	-0.0151***	-0.0166***
	(0.00232)	(0.00384)	(0.00430)
Not in labor force	0.00392	0.0221***	0.0311***
	(0.00447)	(0.00546)	(0.00602)
Farmer	-0.0155***	-0.0550***	-0.155***
	(0.00300)	(0.00666)	(0.0107)

Primary school education	-0.0107***	-0.00951***	-0.0135***
	(0.00199)	(0.00190)	(0.00223)
Secondary	0.0210***	0.0375***	0.0435***
	(0.00209)	(0.00182)	(0.00205)
Post-secondary	0.0606***	0.157***	0.151***
	(0.00270)	(0.00260)	(0.00277)
Married	-0.0152***	0.00477*	0.00652**
	(0.00181)	(0.00197)	(0.00216)
Previous residence in FE state	-0.00898***	0.00130	0.00566
	(0.00175)	(0.00282)	(0.00310)
Black population ratio	0.0107***	0.00645***	0.00575***
	(0.000158)	(0.0000926)	(0.0000928)
Black x black population ratio	0.0218***	0.0000433	-0.00485***
	(0.00184)	(0.00206)	(0.000989)
Per capita income ratio	0.493***	0.736***	0.609***
	(0.00582)	(0.00445)	(0.00440)
Unemployment ratio	0.241***	0.257***	0.241***
	(0.00647)	(0.00221)	(0.00221)
Previous residence in south	0.00873***	0.0429***	0.0543***
	(0.00185)	(0.00296)	(0.00331)
Constant	-0.580***	-0.999***	-0.653***
	(0.00925)	(0.0116)	(0.0127)
N	228234	335917	297110
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Interstate migrant 1940/50	Interstate migrant 1950/60	Interstate migrant 1960/70
Black	-0.0550***	0.0281***	0.0154***
	(0.00291)	(0.00591)	(0.00333)

Table A2. Complete regression results for Specification 2

	(1) Non-south interstate 1940/50	(2) Non-south interstate 1950/60	(3) Non-south interstate 1960/70
Black	-0.0207**	-0.00533	0.000319
	(0.00775)	(0.0102)	(0.00758)
FE enacted	0.0716***	-0.00208	0.00623*
	(0.00146)	(0.00335)	(0.00252)
Year	-0.0401***	0.225***	0.638***
	(0.00161)	(0.00262)	(0.00377)
Black x FE	-0.0686***	0.00263	0.0130
	(0.00781)	(0.0146)	(0.0149)
Black x Year	0.0156*	-0.00704	0.0313
	(0.00634)	(0.0124)	(0.0191)
Year x FE	-0.0706***	-0.0223***	0.0481***
	(0.00256)	(0.00377)	(0.00906)
Black x Year x FE	0.0643***	0.00619	0.0277
	(0.0124)	(0.0188)	(0.0462)
Wage	-0.000256	0.00550***	0.00692***
	(0.000785)	(0.00124)	(0.00150)
Occupational score	0.000183**	0.000214*	0.000147
	(0.0000682)	(0.0000885)	(0.000103)
Age	-0.00273***	-0.00259***	-0.00186**
	(0.000353)	(0.000485)	(0.000570)
Age squared	0.0000201***	0.0000341***	0.0000310***
	(0.00000414)	(0.00000567)	(0.00000670)
Urban residence	-0.0264***	0.0118***	0.0298***
	(0.00122)	(0.00181)	(0.00215)
Employed	-0.0112***	-0.0176***	-0.0206***
	(0.00253)	(0.00445)	(0.00525)
Not in labor force	0.0135**	0.0186**	0.0211**
	(0.00502)	(0.00650)	(0.00756)
Farmer	-0.00199	-0.0363***	-0.109***
	(0.00406)	(0.00884)	(0.0140)
Primary school	-0.0119***	-0.00474*	-0.0123***

education			
	(0.00231)	(0.00224)	(0.00279)
Secondary	0.0142***	0.0279***	0.0365***
	(0.00233)	(0.00203)	(0.00243)
Post-secondary	0.0489***	0.150***	0.152***
	(0.00294)	(0.00289)	(0.00329)
Married	-0.0159***	-0.00534*	-0.00501
	(0.00195)	(0.00226)	(0.00261)
Previous residence in FE state	0.00352	-0.0114***	-0.0178***
	(0.00181)	(0.00331)	(0.00389)
Black population ratio	0.0375***	0.00365***	0.00388***
	(0.000670)	(0.000223)	(0.000219)
Black x black population ratio	0.00796	0.00814**	-0.00385*
	(0.00656)	(0.00260)	(0.00155)
Per capita income ratio	0.563***	1.263***	0.974***
	(0.00991)	(0.0118)	(0.0112)
Unemployment ratio	0.287***	0.205***	0.221***
	(0.00781)	(0.00268)	(0.00266)
Constant	-0.729***	-1.460***	-1.008***
	(0.0123)	(0.0165)	(0.0184)
N	156854	219366	185913

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Complete regression results for Specification 3

	(1) Interstate migrant 1950	(2) Interstate migrant 1960	(3) Interstate migrant 1970	(4) Interstate migrant All years
Black	0.221**	-0.0195**	0.0332***	0.0881***
	(0.0675)	(0.00701)	(0.00524)	(0.00851)
Years since enactment	-0.00380***	-0.00234***	-0.00149***	-0.00326***
	(0.000591)	(0.000178)	(0.0000865)	(0.000125)
Black x years since	0.00283	0.000947	0.00438***	-0.00334***
	(0.00416)	(0.000659)	(0.000306)	(0.000481)
Wage	-0.00129	0.0120***		0.0919***
	(0.00140)	(0.00160)		(0.000886)
Occupational score	-0.000111	0.000369***		-0.000844***
	(0.000117)	(0.000110)		(0.0000856)
Age	-0.00246***	-0.00106		-0.0180***
	(0.000642)	(0.000609)		(0.000466)
Age squared	0.0000217**	0.0000220**		0.000184***
	(0.00000746)	(0.00000712)		(0.00000550)
Urban residence	0.00159	0.0265***		0.00579***
	(0.00245)	(0.00240)		(0.00170)
Employed	0.000252	-0.0193***		-0.0772***
	(0.00537)	(0.00524)		(0.00385)
Not in labor force	0.00331	0.0144		0.0690***
	(0.00842)	(0.00789)		(0.00610)
Farmer	-0.00907	-0.120***		0.0411***
	(0.00947)	(0.0173)		(0.00775)
Primary school education	-0.00184	-0.00722**		-0.00964***
	(0.00261)	(0.00280)		(0.00234)
Secondary	0.00263	0.0281***		0.0454***
	(0.00261)	(0.00252)		(0.00229)
Post-secondary	0.0233***	0.153***		0.196***
	(0.00382)	(0.00356)		(0.00297)
Married	-0.00277	-0.0110***		-0.0864***

	(0.00281)	(0.00277)		(0.00224)
Previous residence in FE state	-0.717***	-0.155***		-0.421***
	(0.0209)	(0.00518)		(0.00500)
Black population ratio	0.00330*	0.00565***		0.00891***
	(0.00166)	(0.000259)		(0.000244)
Black x black population ratio	-0.242***	0.0103***		-0.00142
	(0.0662)	(0.00289)		(0.00136)
Per capita income ratio	0.343***	0.681***		0.0268***
	(0.0321)	(0.00860)		(0.00810)
Unemployment ratio	0.817***	0.257***		0.220***
	(0.0340)	(0.00257)		(0.00359)
Previous residence in south	-0.135***	0.0863***		0.307***
	(0.0308)	(0.00699)		(0.00608)
Constant	-0.347***	-0.664***	0.184***	0.199***
	(0.0651)	(0.0186)	(0.00145)	(0.0151)
N	11353	151452	509577	204220

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4. Complete regression results for Specification 4

	(1) Lifetime 1950	(2) Lifetime 1960	(3) Lifetime 1970
Black	-0.0729	-0.0117	-0.0863**
	(0.0735)	(0.00648)	(0.0291)
Years since enactment	-0.0840***	-0.00225***	0.000524
	(0.00219)	(0.000171)	(0.000475)
Black x years since	-0.0315*	0.000315	0.000457
	(0.0153)	(0.000614)	(0.00172)
Wage	0.00144	0.0141***	-0.00165
	(0.00512)	(0.00154)	(0.00394)
Occupational score	0.00133**	0.000348**	-0.00101***
	(0.000427)	(0.000106)	(0.000269)
Age	0.00450	0.00275***	-0.00604**
	(0.00234)	(0.000585)	(0.00193)
Age squared	-0.0000197	-0.0000125	0.0000858***
	(0.0000272)	(0.00000685)	(0.0000247)
Urban residence	-0.0165	0.0288***	-0.00507
	(0.00897)	(0.00231)	(0.00619)
Employed	0.0185	-0.0135**	-0.000758
	(0.0196)	(0.00502)	(0.0162)
Not in labor force	0.0442	0.0148*	0.00822
	(0.0307)	(0.00756)	(0.0201)
Farmer	-0.0870*	-0.110***	-0.412***
	(0.0346)	(0.0167)	(0.0958)
Primary school education	-0.00386	-0.00635*	-0.0111
	(0.00953)	(0.00269)	(0.0138)
Secondary	0.0196*	0.0224***	0.0428***
	(0.00951)	(0.00242)	(0.00922)
Post-secondary	0.0861***	0.133***	0.119***
	(0.0140)	(0.00343)	(0.00996)
Married	-0.0156	-0.0121***	-0.00325
	(0.0102)	(0.00266)	(0.00686)

Previous residence in FE state	-0.219***	-0.160***	0.120***
	(0.0469)	(0.00499)	(0.00613)
Black population ratio	0.00639***	0.00601***	0.00700***
	(0.00113)	(0.000249)	(0.000441)
Black x black population ratio	0.147***	0.0108***	-0.00783
	(0.0186)	(0.00279)	(0.00659)
Per capita income ratio	1.263***	0.685***	0.317***
	(0.0241)	(0.00820)	(0.0184)
Unemployment ratio	0.113***	0.265***	0.137***
	(0.0273)	(0.00246)	(0.00801)
Born in south	-0.0893***	0.0906***	0.224***
	(0.0225)	(0.00673)	(0.0102)
Constant	-0.779***	-0.806***	0.220***
	(0.0831)	(0.0179)	(0.0456)
N	11252	152733	19823

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5. Complete regression results for Specification 5

	Lifetime, all years
Black	-0.0220***
	(0.00567)
FE	-0.251***
	(0.00425)
1960	0.0253***
	(0.00329)
1970	0.410***
	(0.00501)
Black x FE x 1960	0.205***
	(0.00550)
Black x FE x 1970	0.0950***
	(0.0215)
FE x 1960	-0.0731***
	(0.00386)
FE x 1970	-0.0524***
	(0.00619)
Black x 1960	-0.0528***
	(0.00663)
Black x 1970	-0.183***
	(0.0190)
Wage	0.0163***
	(0.00102)
Occupational score	-0.000923***
	(0.0000756)
Age	-0.000157
	(0.000417)
Age squared	0.0000192***
	(0.0000049)
Urban residence	0.0537***
	(0.00153)
Employed	-0.0165***
	(0.00386)

Not in labor force	0.0152**
	(0.00537)
Farmer	-0.102***
	(0.00696)
Primary level education	-0.0137***
	(0.00195)
Secondary	0.0363***
	(0.00185)
Post-secondary	0.146***
	(0.00254)
Married	0.000758
	(0.00195)
Previous residence in FE state	0.0788***
	(0.00267)
Black population ratio	0.00484***
	(0.0000849)
Black x black population ratio	-0.000272
	(0.00189)
Per capita income ratio	1.054***
	(0.00468)
Unemployment ratio	0.224***
	(0.00208)
Born in south	-0.143***
	(0.00281)
Constant	-1.007***
	(0.0113)
N	375497

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$