Effectiveness of location-based evaluation of government services in improving Indian governance

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Summary

The primary point of interface between the government and the people is through the various public service agencies that the government has in place. Given that the government agencies are the first point of contact between the government and the people, it is crucial that we consider this relationship in understanding the quality of governance. Although it is clear that the government agencies in India still follow a conventional bureaucratic paradigm, the effectiveness of the current model is far from obvious. The following quote from the resulting analysis of the 2005 Indian corruption study undertaken by Transparency International, India gives us a clue:

"…*while due attention continues to be devoted to macro issues, we cannot afford to any longer delay fully restoring efficient and honest functioning in the districts, where our people live and where all the vital development programs concerning their welfare are executed.*" (Agarwal, 2008)

The 2005 Indian corruption study, while evaluating most government services across India, focused primarily on the evaluation of corruption in those services and not the quality of service itself. Even the famous citizen report cards have not really focused on the "efficient and honest functioning in the districts" (ibid) and have focused on a more macro approach: "a stratified random sample survey of nearly 1140 households" asking them about their perceptions of various government agencies (Ravindra, 2004, pp 2). Hence, the need for a systematic and holistic rating of the government services arises that introduces a strain of direct accountability on an office by office basis that ensures that the

"the vital development programs concerning… (Citizens') welfare are executed" to the best fashion in the individual government offices that people interact with.

This paper will deal with the methodology that we adopted to create this monitoring & evaluation (M&E) capacity that deals with the actual "point of contact" between the citizens and the government and closely tied to actual "execution" of services for 6 different government agencies/service providers in Bangalore city (in terms of what data we collected, how we collected it, how we analyzed it, the trends we found, and how we're disseminating it).

The 6 government agencies that we are dealing with are: Police Stations, Regional Transport Offices (RTOs), BWSSB, BDA, BESCOM, and BBMP. Most of the arguments made in this paper will centre on the data collected for police stations and RTOs, since we are still in the process of collecting data for the other four agencies.

The difference between the earlier macro approaches (like the CRCs, corruption study) that attempt to strengthen M&E capabilities in India and the approach that we adopted in this research project is three-fold:

a) We decided to collect data on the service provision of government offices and agencies within Bangalore on a location-by-location basis. So our data can closely reflect the experience of citizens in government offices as it connects to actual "execution" of the government's functions, as opposed to a general recognition of a macro trend across a civic agency.

b) Our data has been collected *on site* in the government offices as opposed to in households (like the CRCs). This ensures a reduction in the perception bias and self-fulfilling prophecy bias and ensures that the responses to our survey are more likely

to be influenced by the immediate experience that the citizen has just had and nothing else.

c) Unlike, the 2005 India Corruption Study, we have not collected any objective data in this research project. The data we have collected through this questionnaire is completely subjective and is intended so to capture the experience (and the assessment of the experience) of the individual citizen in India.

To begin with, we will discuss the need for a new method of evaluating government services and lead into the setup and methodology of our surveys and data collection; then we will deal with the how we analyzed this data and what we found; then using theoretical constructs and incentive structures we will analyze how this data represents something distinctive and can create accountability structures where none exist right now; and finally we will talk about the methods of dissemination that we have adopted for this data, and why this can bolster the incentive structures and accountability mechanisms already talked about and bring them into reality, while adding new ones.

This is hence a paper that is equal parts academic and experiential. While traditional academic precepts (like setup and methodology, incentive structures etc) will be honored, this paper will be written in the context and lens of the actual experience we had in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating this data.

1. **Brief evaluation of previous initiatives**

Although there have been many small scale initiatives on measuring the satisfaction of citizens of various public service agencies, the Citizen report cards and the 2005 Transparency International study on corruption in India are the two main initiatives we evaluate in this paper.

1.1 Citizen Report Card (CRC)

The Citizen report cards were the result of a citizen feedback initiative undertaken by the Bengaluru based Public Affairs Center, to measure and record public satisfaction of various public sector agencies. The main aspects assessed by the CRCs were (i) Overall public satisfaction (ii) Staff behavior, quality of service and information accessibility (iii) Speed money paid [to grease the sytem] (iv) Cost of compensatory investments made by citizens (Ravindra, 2004). So far, there have been three such report card initiatives completed in 1994, 1999 and 2003 respectively. The primary means of data collection for the report cards was household surveys. While household surveys provide a good snapshot of overall perception of government agencies, "it is virtually impossible to design a measurement approach that allows households to rank satisfaction unambiguously" (Deichmann & Lall, 2003). Additionally, the citizen report cards have been undertaken with a gap of at least five years between successive undertakings and given a history of governments not completing their five-year terms, the conclusions could be rendered obsolete and be passed off as the 'doings of incapable previous governments' by newer incumbents of office. The reason for not carrying out the CRC initiative every other year or even each year is the high cost of undertaking thousands of household surveys for each round of CRCs[1]. Hence, the need for a more economical and thus more frequent evaluation of public services becomes

evident. Furthermore, to efficiently capture multiple data points, the household surveys were designed to be long[1]. The length of the survey, while adding to the expenses associated with surveying, also tends to include "response biases caused by boredom and fatigue" (Hinkin, 1998). Lastly, an important criticism for the CRCs has been that of lack of inclusion of the explanations of the government officers on the level of their service provision. While the views of senior officers were taken into consideration, the challenges faced by the employees who deal with citizens everyday have not been sufficiently accommodated by the CRCs.

1.2 India Corruption Study, 2005 (ICS)

"*The aim of the corruption study undertaken by Transparency International India is to sensitize the people of India against all-pervasive corruption faced on a day-to-day basis by the common man*" (ICS, 2005). The study was mostly focused on collecting objective data about the corruption faced while availing of public services. The ICS, similar to the Citizen report cards, primarily employed household surveys to measure corruption in public services. It is important to note that the ICS mainly captured statistical data of corruption in government services and it does not really present a comprehensive picture on the quality of service delivered by the public service agencies.

Additionally, the study encompassed most Indian states, making it a very large undertaking, thereby presenting a better evaluation for the central government to evaluate its performance (ibid). However, it is the bureaucrats at the state level that oversee the performance of the government agencies in each state and the large scope of the ICS

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[1] As mentioned by senior staff of PAC during a visit to their office in early August 2011.

relatively eases the burden of responsibility off the shoulders of the concerned bureaucrats at the state level (Agarwal, 2008). This lack of direct accountability hinders the provision of citizen groups with the voice they need to demand better service from individual government agencies. Finally, while we argue later in the paper that exposing the common man to figures of petty corruption is hardly sensitizing, we seek to look at the ICS as a foundation to develop our method on.

Therefore, it is clear that a better method of evaluation needs to be economical, frequent, focused and provide better incentive structures for citizens to demand better service and for the government officers to voice their challenges.

2. Survey Setup and Methodology

In this section we will discuss the setup of our survey questionnaire and initiate an explication of the overall methodology we have used in this project.

2.1 Choice of agencies

Given multiple resource constraints, our study focuses on six government agencies in the Indian city of Bengaluru. The six agencies we considered were the following:

1. *BESCOM (Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited)*: Controls the electricity supply and establishes new power connections. BESCOM has citizens visiting the office locations for some services and also sends its agents to the citizens' households for more specific needs.

2. *RTO (Regional Transport Office)*: Deals with all transport related services such as licenses, permits, registration, among others. RTOs have very clear cut location-

based offices that deal only with citizens living in their assigned locations. All services provided by the RTOs are done so in their physical office locations.

3. *BDA (Bangalore Development Authority)*: Deals primarily with land allocation and infrastructure development. BDA is similar to BESCOM in dual service provision (offices and households).

4. *BWSSB (Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board)*: Provides drinking water and sewage reduction and treatment services. While most services BWSSB provides necessitate its agents going to households, a few make it imperative for citizens to be present at the office location.

5. *BBMP (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike)*: Deals with property tax as well as town planning and infrastructure development. The BBMP hence provides their services on a household basis and to the city as a whole; however, a minor percentage of their transactions with the citizens occurs in the actual office locations.

6. *Police stations*: Uphold law and order in the city. The police stations provide their services on a household basis and to the city as a whole; most citizen-police interactions however take place in the police stations.

The agencies we selected represent a mix of essential and non-essential services and denote what we saw as a cross-section of a citizen's life in relation to the services provided by the government: home, water, electricity, infrastructure, safety and security, and transport.

2.2 Details of the Survey Questionnaire

We designed a survey whose primary respondents were randomly chosen people at the concerned government office. Our surveying method was quite similar to that of exit polls, as the surveys recorded the perception of the individual while the experience of using the government agency was still fresh in memory. However, BBMP, BESCOM, BDA and BWSSB had most of their services interacting with citizens outside of their physical office spaces, so we had to survey respondents in their homes about those agencies.

The following are the questions from the survey included is the manner in which they were asked:

On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the least and 10 being the highest, please rate the following:

- How simple and organized was the process?

- How helpful and accessible were the government officers?

- How fast did you get what you came for?

- How costly (in terms of total money spent and work hours missed) was the process?

- How clean were your surroundings?

Please select Yes/No for the following:

- Did you use a middleman for the service?

- Were you threatened in any way?

- Were you asked to pay a bribe?

- Would you use this office again?

2.2.1 Perception vs. Objective data

On first glance, it might seem contradictory that a survey that is aimed at getting at a holistic rating of a service uses so subjective a questionnaire. Johnston and Kpundeh (2002) further bolster the seeming contradiction with their belief that "*perception data are just that estimates of how corrupt a society is thought to be- and are thus open to influence and distortion from the full range of factors affecting any human judgments.*" However, the importance of perception in rating a service where interaction between people is unavoidable [as yet], is immense.

In a nation where billions of dollars have recently vanished owing to corruption scandals, objective data on the amount of money that an individual spends to get a service done is hardly news. For instance, in just 2011, the Telecom License scandal cost the Indian exchequer $40 billion while the 2010 Commonwealth Games scandal resulted in overspending due to corruption and lack of accountability by about $3 billion[2]. At a current conversion rate of about 46 INR to 1 USD and a rural minimum wage between $2 and $4 per day, corruption scandals running into billions of dollars are impossible to even fathom (Labor bureau, 2009). Yet, with such frequent and expensive scandals desensitizing the Indian population to actual monetary figures, we believe that ratings and rankings are an effective way of revisiting corruption and transparency in government agencies without seeming uninteresting. Since the government agencies are service-based agencies, it is crucial to consider the experience of individuals as can be gleaned from their perceptions. And this is truly a democratic measure of service in that it reinforces that each person holds the government to a different standard (something which cannot be captured by a

single objective factor), and that the objective [2] of a service-based agency is to meet these standards to the *satisfaction of each citizen,* not to any definitive figure or objective measure.

Additionally, not all factors lend themselves to an objective factual rating system. For instance, cleanliness is a very subjective experience and cannot be easily made into a common checklist that results in a rating. More importantly, it is our belief that the government should aim for the highest standards demanded by its citizens as betterment is a continual process that does not plateau out.

2.2.2 Discussion of questions:

In this section, we discuss the reasons behind the questions included in the survey. While there could be a more scientific way to come up with the list of questions to be included in the survey, we went with initial personal opinion in formulating the questions. Then, we selected 30 citizens at random in various areas in the city and asked them of what factors they thought should be included in a survey of this nature. Then, we showed them the list of questions that we came up with. This process resulted in the survey above [section 2.1] and over 90% of the respondents were in agreement with all aspects of the survey. Additional factors we chose not to include but were suggested by the respondents include *bribe amount, number of visits to the office, time spent at the office, information access,* among others.

Specifically, we wanted to find macro patterns in each office so as to get snapshots that could direct the government towards making services better and could bring about

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[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12769214

awareness in people to demand better service from the agencies. Additionally, one crucial aspect that we absolutely wanted to stay the course on was to keep the survey as short as possible. While this approach could limit the data points we would get, it would drastically improve the accuracy of the data received, especially since the fatigue caused by a long survey can introduce a bias in the data (Hinkin, 1998). With that goal, we have identified that the key areas that needed to be rated were: the process itself, the officers, the output and the physical office space.

Firstly, with regard to the process itself, from a macro scale, the overall experience of the respondent is what we wanted to record in the survey. While the question itself ("How simple and organized was the process") might seem a bit ambiguous, it was intentional to extract the perception of the respondent of the entire process rather than that of specific factors of the process. We could have simply asked the respondent to "*rate the process*" instead; however, in that case, the chances that the respondent rates the process itself poorly for the dismal performance of any other factor, say cleanliness, is high. Hence, the inclusion of *simple and organized* seemed the best option. Following a similar pattern of reasoning, we decided to go with "*How helpful and accessible were the government officers*" as either *helpful* or *accessible* alone could have narrowed down the perception recorded and the presence of neither could render the recorded perception too weak to be meaningful.

Secondly, the output itself is probably the most important factor to consider because if the output of a service itself were not satisfactory, then any perception of the physical office space or the simplicity of the process would be tainted. With the output, the two most important factors that the 30 respondents identified and we agree with are speed and cost.

Speed here refers to the perception of how fast the service was rendered and cost refers to the total opportunity cost borne by the respondent in getting the service. While opportunity cost would include, although indirectly, the speed with which the respondent got the service, we felt it essential to make speed a standalone factor since it is a strong proxy for efficiency by itself.

Thirdly, with regard to the physical office space, we realize that while spaciousness, comfort and other factors are important, given the limited time citizens spend at the physical office location, cleanliness is perhaps a more important factor to be considered. Additionally, cleanliness is also a factor that captures how professional an organization is and how seriously it takes the satisfaction of its clients. Fourthly, the three objective questions are the pivots that we hope to use to analyze the other factors with; so for instance, with *middlemen* as the pivoting axis, we hope to analyze how fast a service would be delivered if a respondent used a middleman vs. if the respondent did not use one. Lastly, the scale between 1 and 10 for the perception questions has been assigned because a scale of 1-5 seemed too narrow to sufficiently capture perception and a scale longer than 1-10 would make it statistically difficult to identify any pattern that could stand out otherwise.

3. Data Analysis and Trends

In this section we will complete the explication of the methodology of our project by detailing what we did with the data we found from section 1, and what we found as a result.

3.1 The How of Data Analysis

The wide plethora of data we collected (almost all on paper) needed to be entered into an excel database, and various formulas and macros in Microsoft Excel were used to search for trends.

We analyzed the service ratings survey data we collected in three ways:

1. As inputs to a ratings algorithm to draw individual ratings for government office locations.

2. To find individual data trends by comparing patterns among different strands of data within the same department. For instance, finding the mean value for the "speed of service" for all citizens who used middlemen versus for all citizens that did not use middlemen in Bangalore's RTOs.

3. To find correlations among the different questions of our survey questionnaire across multiple government departments within the same geographic location. For instance, checking if there is a correlation between the amount of bribes paid to police stations and the amount of bribes paid to civic agencies like the BDA and BWSSB within the same geographic location.

We will now discuss each of these three analysis points in detail.

3.1.1 The Ratings Algorithm:

An individual rating for each office branch would help in painting a snapshot of the entire city of Bangalore, allowing for rankings and easy comparisons for both the public and policymakers alike. As already discussed in the prior section, all the respondents to our survey questionnaire were asked to rate between 8-9 questions (depending on the

respective department) on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest. Here we detail the methodology we used to obtain a "rating" out of the individual data points we obtained from each survey.

To begin with, we assigned weights to each question. This required that we prioritize our questions from the most important to the least important. We used three methods for this prioritization. :

a) First section of questionnaire: We conducted surveys among individual focus groups in Bangalore that consisted of students, both public and private sector employees, retirees and homemakers (of both genders) asking them to prioritize all the given questions in terms of importance to them when they want to get a government service. We found overwhelmingly that speed of service and cost were the most important factors, while cleanliness was found to be the least important factor. Also while "simplicity and organization" factor was important, people said they would be willing to "put this on a backburner" if it meant getting a service faster. Using this metric we organized the first five questions of the questionnaire (the ones to be rated on a scale of 1-10) in the following order of priority: Speed, Cost, Simplicity and Organization of the process, Helpfulness and Accessibility of officers, Cleanliness.

b) Second section of questionnaire: This deals with the second part of the survey questionnaire (the three questions to be answered with a yes/no). If a middleman was used, then that would mean that question 2 would be skewed (since there would then be very little interaction between the citizen and the government officers) and there would be a similar skew in questions 1, 3, and 4. And since

middlemen are by definition antithetical to the existing processes and mechanisms (viz. they are doing a job that is supposed to be already done by the government agency), this is largely a function of how badly that particular government location is handling its own work. So we decided to give no plus points for not using middlemen, and subtract points for using a middleman. "Were you threatened, viz. asked to pay a bribe?" is directly tied to the middlemen question (because if a middleman was used, he would grease the wheels by himself, and you would never know if part of your middleman fee went towards paying a bribe or circumventing a "threat" of bribery). So if the answer was yes, we decided to subtract points. If the answer was no, but a middleman was used we decided to give no points. If the answer was no, and no middleman was used, we decided to give full points.

c) Tying the two sections together with numbers: We decided the numerical weighting through a combination of two factors:

i)   Gut feeling and intuition

ii)   Factoring for trade-offs between sections (skew in questions 1-4 because of middlemen for instance)

But i) was easily the driving force behind this. We did this based on the advice of Prof. Dan Schult (Math department at Colgate University) who suggested that the best way to build the numeric of the ratings algorithm is on gut feeling; and after testing out the algorithm in a beta run, talking to experts in the field about whether the "ratings" we have obtained make sense to them. The weights have been listed in the appendix. This algorithm and the data we collected then withstood the expert

scrutiny of Public Affairs Centre (the NGO that started the famous Citizen Report Cards which have been replicated around the world, and which was one of our points of reference while building this project), Prof. Michael Johnston (our mentor on this project and director of TI USA), and five different ordinary citizens that we "picked off the street" to test the algorithm.

This ratings algorithm approach enabled us to rank our individual Regional Transport Offices, and police station branches. This is important because it gives us an output of a single number that can be compared across government office branches within the same department and across multiple departments. It captures all of the individual questions and (to an extent) the relationships between these questions in one number that can then be used to rank branches, departments, and different geographic areas as a whole. It gives us a single "unit" (like "metres" to measure distance) so to speak for government efficiency and service provision.

3.1.2 Individual Data Trends Within the Same Department Across Geographic Locations

We searched for patterns within each government department also. Data trends that we found important were:

1. Geo-mapping and choice: Given that our data is mostly location-based (sourced from the individual office branches of the government agencies) we were able to geo-map our results, both ratings and occurrences of corruption. For instance we were able to see which part of Bangalore had the best police station with the least instances of corruption (hence enabling people to make a choice of the "safest place"

to live), or the part of Bangalore which had the most efficient RTO (ensuring a quick vehicular registration and issuance of DL), or the part of Bangalore where the BDA is least corrupt (hence enabling the simplest hassle-free construction of a house) etc. This empowers personal choice for Bangalore's public, and helps directs private investment (as explicated in the section "Why this data is more actionable than any other set of data in the past").

2. Comparison of different data strands to check for correlations or even causations: We searched for correlations between different strands of data (a strand of data is the list of ratings we got for a particular question). So we were able to study for instance whether there was any correlation between paying bribes/being threatened and the likelihood of wanting to use that particular office again; or whether there was any correlation between speed of service and cost of service (as the speed of service goes down, one would expect the cost in terms of time to go up, but in the same vein as the cost in terms of money goes up, one would expect the speed of service to go up (surprisingly there was no correlation at all) at the government agencies.

3. The role of middlemen: The archetypal middleman who stands in strategic locations outside major government offices in Bangalore is someone you pay a fee to in the belief that he can get things done for you faster (greasing the wheels of the bureaucracy through his range of contacts within the office) and with no "running around" necessary on your part. We decided to sift through the data we had collected through the service rating surveys and see if the middlemen were really performing well on these above two metrics, and whether they were making life

better for citizens. We compared various key values and data points between citizens who did use middlemen and citizens who didn't use middlemen. For instance for the RTOs, we compared the mean values of all the ratings given for the "speed of service" question for citizens who used middlemen to the mean values of all the ratings given for the "speed of service" question for citizens who did not use middlemen. This is important because middlemen cause a lot of perversion of regular functioning and service provision at government offices, and sometimes cause undeserving people to get services if they are able to pay for it (for instance enabling a bad driver to get a Driving License); and if they aren't able to deliver on the above two metrics, then the harms of the middleman system far outweigh the benefits on an individual and macro level.

3.1.3 Data Trends Across Different Government Agencies Within the Same Geographic Area

Since we have completed surveys for all the major RTOs and the major police stations in Bangalore, and have further done an initial zonal-wise survey for the civic agencies: BDA, BBMP, BESCOM, and BWSSB, we are able to study if there is any correlation between level of service offered & levels of corruption to geographic area. In other words, it is possible to find trends of high or low service efficiency, and/or high or low corruption levels across multiple departments within the same geographic area. To find out, we collected and compared said data in excel so that we could demarcate different areas in Bangalore city according to their levels of corruption/efficiency of service offering. We divided Bangalore city according to the different levels of corruption in each geographic location into five

distinct shades of color (each darker shade of color representing a higher level of corruption, similar to the corruption map drawn out by TI using their CPI scores).

3.2 What We Found

3.2.1 Regional Transport Offices (RTOs)

There are six RTOs in all in the city of Bengaluru and we surveyed around 15 respondents in each office. The very initial set of data that we generated was that of the ratings of each individual office (as in the Table 2 below)

RTO	Service Index	Simplicity	Helpfulness	Speed	Cost	Cleanliness
Rajajinagar	4.41	5.53	4.47	3.47	6.27	3.67
Jayanagar	4.18	4.90	4.65	4.94	6.55	4.19
Indiranagar	3.93	4.09	5.36	5.25	5.42	3.5
Yelahanka	4.39	4.26	4.56	3	5.53	6.21
Yeshwantpur	4.8	7.09	6.47	6	7.05	5.62
Koramangala	4.21	5.14	5	4.71	5.85	4.57

Table 2 – RTOs Ratings

Patterns observed:

1. Going by the service index, none of the RTOs have, on average, fulfilled even half of the expectations of the citizens. The Yeshwanthpur RTO ranks the best among all

RTOs with a service rating of 4.39. While this depicts the sad state of the RTOs currently, it also conveys another important idea: as excessive corruption and inefficiency are desensitizing the people as a nation, this statistic tells us that people are still expecting better service from the government and have not given up hope yet.

Middleman	Simplicity	Helpfulness	Speed	Cost	Cleanliness
No	5.234	5.276	4.276	6	4.297
Yes	5.289	5.132	4.492	6.265	4.737

Table 3- Middleman usage vs. factor averages

2. In all of the surveys we got from the RTOs, 49.5% of the respondents used middleman while 50.5% did not use a middleman to get their work done. This is a very healthy trend, given that more middlemen would mean making the system more corrupt. However, it is not entirely accurate as we found later that applications for driving licenses are only accepted before lunch; given that most middlemen broker getting driving licenses, the probability that a respondent surveyed during the afternoon has used an agent, is low. However, this does provide a glimmer of hope as any change instituted by the government to make the driving license process more efficient by removing the middlemen would essentially eliminate them from the RTOs.

3. While it might seem that we have simply assumed that the middlemen hinder the agencies from working efficiently, further analysis of the data in Table 3 bolsters our

stance. We find that it does not really matter if one used an agent or not, because on average, the service process, customer care and service delivery stay in very close range without much deviation, with respect to the factors mentioned in the survey. This is more pertinent to the government than to the customers using the service because from a macro level, the government is not benefitting from having middlemen at the RTOs.

Middleman	Threatened %	Use again %
No	12.76595745	46.80851064
Yes	10.86956522	36.95652174

Table 4 – Middleman usage vs. Repeat use of agency

4. For the citizens that use the RTOs, however, it is crucial be aware that of all the people that used middlemen to get their service done, only 37% want to use the office again- meaning the experience was not as good as they had hoped for 63% of the people that used middlemen. On the other hand, 47% of the people who did not use a middleman wanted to use the office again. So, there is a higher chance that a citizen would have a better overall customer experience if he/she did not use a middleman.

	Simplicity	Helpfulness	Speed	Cost	Cleanliness
No middleman	5	7	2	8	5
Yes middleman	6	5	5	10	7

Table 5 –Middleman usage vs. Modes of factors

5. Although the previous pattern shows the relative lack of merit in using a middleman to get work done in an RTO, the modes of the factors (Table 5 above) show otherwise. There is 19% chance that if you do not use a middleman, your perception of service would be a 2 whereas there is 15% chance that your perception will rank to 5 if you used a middleman.

Middleman usage	Simplicity	Helpfulness	Speed	Cost	Cleanliness
No	5	6	4	6	5
Yes	6	5	5	7	5

Table 6 –Middleman usage vs. Medians of factors

6. The mode, however, can be misleading. Hence, it is crucial to also consider the medians to look at the spread of ratings. In table 6, we find that regardless of whether one uses a middleman or not, the medians do not differ by much at all. In fact, this means for instance, that there is close to a 50% chance that you would be happy with the speed of service delivery whether you use an agent or not. The same is true also of the rest of the factors as the medians are so close in range. It is interesting to note that the marginal cost of a coin flip's chance of getting service done faster runs into thousands of rupees (for instance, for a Driving license).

7. Finally, we found that there is no correlation between the perception of speed and cost – so the higher the perception of money spent, the perception of speed of service delivery has not necessarily gone up. This could however just mean that

people perceive the same amount of monetary cost at different levels of expensiveness.

Although we have found many smaller patterns, the above are the more significant ones that we chose to present in this paper.

3.2.2 Police Stations:

There are 104 police stations in Bengaluru city and we have shortlisted 45 of them to survey based on geographic distribution. Additionally, the police stations that we identified are relatively high traffic ones with at least 2 cases registered every day, on average. We would further like to add a disclaimer in this section to make it clear that when we asked people if they felt "threatened", a "yes" reply has meant a range of things, from passive inactivity on work unless paid a bribe to actual threats and that's what we would like it to be read as.

Police station	Service Index	Police station	Service index
Commercial street	4.9	Upparpet	5.11
Tilak nagar	4.46	JC Nagar	4.52
Hanumantha Nagar	5.14	HAL Airport	5.74
Madiwala	4.43	Vidhana Soudha	5.03
Kengeri	3.72	Peenya	4.49
Rajaji Nagar	5.28	Yelahanka	4.55
Jayanagar	4.16	KR Puram	4.23
Basaveshwaranagar	5.34	Cubbon Park	4.69
City Market	5.11	RT Nagar	4.4
Magadi Road	4.98	Koramangala	4.41
Pulakeshi Nagar	5.03	Banshankari	4.49
Kalasipalya	4.63	Yeshwantpura	4.35
Wilson Garden	4.88	Amrutahalli	4.58
JP Nagar	4.63	Hennur	4.66
Chickpet	5.2	Sanjay nagar	5.02
Chamarajpet	4.82	Vijay Nagar	5.15
Ulsoor	5.33	Airport Road	5.47

| Indira Nagar | 5.55 | Banaswadi | 5.75 |

Table 7 – Police Stations and service index rating

1. Police stations, quite similar to RTOs have barely registered any satisfied customers. The pattern reigning in the service ratings is again one that barely meets half the expectations that citizens have. The Kengeri and Basaveshwaranagar police stations have so far been rated the lowest and quite expectedly, close to 60% and 100% of the randomly chosen respondents were threatened, respectively. To prove that it is not a mere coincidence, Hanumanthanagar Police station has ranked among the top five the police stations above and 94% of the respondents surveyed there were not threatened; additionally, 100% of the respondents indicated that they would want to use the office again.

	Yes %	No %
Threaten	39.59390863	60.40609137
Repeat	44.16243655	55.83756345

Table 8 – Percentage of respondents threatened, would use the agency again

2. On a macro scale, close to 40% of the respondents overall felt they were threatened- a staggering number that reiterates the findings of the 2005 TI India corruption study.

Threatened	Use again %
Yes	15.38461538

| No | 63.02521008 |

Table 9 – Percentage or respondents that would use agency again by whether threatened

3. Perhaps one of the most striking trends we found was that 86% of people who were threatened said they would not want to use the same police station again if they had a choice. Based on anecdotal evidence, it seems that a significant percentage of the remaining 14% were cynical about the fact that there could be any other mechanism or agency within the government that would solve their problem without threatening them, so they said they would come back to the respective police station anyway.

3.2.3 BBMP, BWSSB, BDA, BESCOM Zonal surveys

In the offices that were neither police stations nor RTOs, our approach was to employ zonal surveys that differ from the above paradigm in two ways:

1. We conducted these surveys in households on a zonal basis. For instance the BBMP has divided Bangalore into eight zones, with each zone under the jurisdiction of an additional commissioner. So we are collecting data from random households within each zone to obtain a rating for each zone. So in that sense it is still location-based. There are three reasons we chose to conduct these surveys in households:

a) The interaction between the citizens and the government in the provision of services in these four agencies is split between time spent in the government offices themselves and time spent with government officers and workers in the households of the respective citizens, with a greater chunk of the actual service

provided at households (which makes sense for things like electricity, water, construction etc).

b) As a direct consequence, we found in our experience of collecting data for these civic agencies, that there was only a very thin and uneven stream of citizens who were actually at the government offices of these four agencies. The citizens that were actually in the offices seemed to be there to deal with exceptional circumstances (based on anecdotal evidence) and hence would not be a very representative sample of data.

c) The major chunk of the experience of citizens with these agencies was in their households on a regular basis. For instance, let us consider BESCOM, which provides electricity to citizens. The service provided is the setting up of an electrical connection, and the maintenance of that electric connection over an extended period of time. Hence we decided that conducting this survey at households would provide the most accurate picture of the quality of service provided.

2. These zonal surveys basically had the same questions in the survey, but with an added '*on average*'. So, a respondent would rate the service experience of BBMP on average based on all the interactions with the office that the respondent can summon to memory. This can also primarily be explained by reason c) in the point above. The service is provided on a regular basis in the case of these civic agencies, as opposed to, for instance, the RTOs, where each service is a one-time affair (for instance, getting your Driver's License, or getting your vehicle registered).

Patterns Found:

1. One very important pattern we have gleaned from the data we currently possess is one of cross-comparison between different government agencies in the same area.

    1.1. The Subramanyapuram police station ranks the lowest among all police stations while the Indira Nagar RTO under which Subramanyapuram falls is also the lowest ranking RTO of all. Additionally, 100% of the respondents of the zonal surveys in Subramanyapuram stated that they were threatened while availing services in all four offices (BDA, BBMP, BESCOM, BWSSB). Not surprisingly, none of them wanted to deal with those offices again, if they had a choice. It is however surprising to note that the Indira Nagar police station ranks among the highest; empirically, from our surveying experience, we note that the inspector heading the agency had a high level of integrity and it is perhaps that factor that contributed significantly to its high rating.

    1.2. Further bolstering this pattern is the finding that 60% of the respondents of the police station surveys and a staggering 100% of the zonal survey respondents for the other four offices in Kengeri [second lowest ranked police station] indicated that they were threatened. Additionally, 98% of them indicated that they would not want to deal with any of those offices again while the remaining 2% did not reply to the question.

While we are still in data entry phase and are waiting on getting the complete data set from the zonal surveys, the cross-agency location specific pattern in the prevalence of corruption and inefficiency across government departments and agencies within the same geographical area has three important implications:

1. It is an indication supporting our claim that a 'geomap' can be created across Bangalore city with acertain homogeneity of corruption/inefficiency within individual geographical areas.

2. That there is a higher authority (higher than any employees at individual office branches within a particular geographical area) within each geographical area who either is not doing his job or is doing it maliciously. This implication is necessary to explain homogenous corruption/inefficacy across somewhat disconnected government agencies in the same area. This higher authority could be a Corporator, an MLA, or someone else. It will take further research to find patterns in that regard (as to who this higher authority is).

3. This would have very important implications for decisions taken by individuals (like where to buy a house for instance) and indeed, by private investment as a whole. This will be explained more in detail in the following section, but in general, this "geomap" can play a very important role in attracting or dissuading investment to/from particular areas. This would further incentivize the government officers & the higher authority mentioned in the previous point within each area to elevate standards and decrease corruption in government services.

This is hence a very important result that can have very many implications (as will be outlined in the following section) and is something that could not have been captured by the CRC approach or by the TI approach to government services. This is something that requires a location-based focus and is something that can turn out to be the most important result of this research.

4. Incentive Structures & Accountability Mechanisms with "Location-Based" Profiles

We're creating location-based profiles for each government office branch in Bangalore city. So each profile has service ratings, employees' views, & corruption data associated with that location. This creates a relative comparison between different branches of each government department, between different government departments in different areas of the city & across cities. Under this section we are going to analyze the incentive structures among the various official and government actors that past crowdsourcing initiatives have successfully manipulated, and using that precedent, we will analyze the changes in the incentive structures that location based "profiles" (which have ratings, employees' views and corruption data) can have. Since earlier initiatives have largely utilized a more macro approach to governmental efficiency and corruption (refer (Ravindra, 2004) for details on the CRC for instance), this new location-based approach offers data that is distinctive and more actionable, especially on the level of *daily execution* of macro-policies and programs undertaken by the government administration. This section will explore how this approach bolsters the accountability mechanisms of existing macro-approaches to M&E capacities, while adding new capacities on the level of daily execution and at the point of contact between citizens and government officers. Of course, we will assume governmental actors to be rational for this analysis.

    a) Involving the Authorities: Ravindra says that one of the weaknesses of the Citizen Report Cards was "the PAC's decision to restrict the Report Card focus to the customers or citizens, while not surveying the views or opinions of officials of the PSAs which provided the services. The poor quality of service may, at times, be due to factors beyond the control of the agencies" (Ravindra, 2004). For instance, in an

interview with Bangalore's Joint Commissioner of Transport for Bangalore Urban and Rural, Mr. H.G. Kumar, he told us that the number of government employees in the various RTOs in Bangalore had "actually fallen in 2011 from a figure of 2000 employees in 1961, while the number of vehicles on the road had increased exponentially", and hence government employees are dealing with at least "ten times the workload they're supposed to bear". We think that these inputs are really important in creating a set of actionable data for the authorities. It gives one a more complete picture of what is going on and how best to resolve the situation as you are able to consider the two sides of the coin and make the most rational decision.

As a result in our location-based profiles for each government office location, we also include the views of the officers/authorities in charge of that particular government branch. This ensures that a policymaker looking at this can make the best holistic decision with knowledge of all the important constraints. And further, it lets the public know about the existence of these constraints, hence allowing them to look at government office inefficiency more objectively, and consider what their mechanisms for redressal could be. For instance the public could stop blaming the RTO officers they meet on a daily basis, and blame the upper echelons of the Transport Ministry and the Transport Department for not earmarking more funds for modernization of and recruitments to the RTOs of Bangalore city.

While trying to collect data for this section, we have hit significant roadblocks and a lot of bureaucracy. Also based on our experience with the employees in the Rajajinagar and Yeshwantpur RTOs, it seems like they are willing to talk about various problems they face (like staffing issues etc), but are less willing

to go on record. But after obtaining an official seal of permission from the Additional Commissioner of Transport in Bangalore (which was a bureaucratic nightmare), it seems like things are moving more smoothly. Right now we are still in the process of collecting this data from the officers and hopefully this will make the changes detailed above.

a) For Local Offices: Given that we have achieved a system of location-based information, it is already evident to us which local branches of government departments are worse than others. For instance we have found in our data that the police station in Kengeri with a service rating of 3.72/10 and almost 60% of respondents having reported being threatened into paying a bribe is worse than the police station in Hanumantha Nagar which has a service rating of 5.14/10 and around 7% of respondents having reported being threatened into paying a bribe. Now according to Robert Wade, officials in India have two major incentives: first, "officials (in India) have a preference ranking of posts" where "desirable posts" have the best amenities and the biggest budgets (Wade, 1985), and officials aspire to these posts; second, in local administrative offices in India, "the (local) official has an incentive to maximize his revenue collections in post" (Wade, 1985). Wade says that if this official drives off the public and contractors by "increasing the rate of extortion" or by being "worse" than a comparable official from a surrounding constituency (now that location-based information has been introduced), then the "public and contractors may complain about him" (ibid). Elected representatives who depend on the public for votes and the contractors for finance would seek to "curb the official" or have him transferred to a less desirable location (ibid). Hence

officials always stay within a certain upper bound of corruption and inefficiency. Now using Wade's incentive structure, the status quo of disgust at graft among India's populace (Burke, 2011), and the location-based potential of our crowdsourced information, it becomes clear that these incentives will start moving in virtuous cycles to an overall improvement in local administration. Let's expand on this.

Now the public and the contractors are able to track the standards of governmental office locations around any particular city, and armed with this information, they are more likely to hold the government offices they're dealing with to the higher standards of the *better offices* in that city. Let's consider the example of Kengeri police station and Hanumantha Nagar police station. On dissemination of the data that we collected, it's clear that the "acceptable upper bound of corruption and inefficiency" for the citizens of Kengeri will fall down, since they will see how much better their fellow citizens in Hanumantha Nagar have it. They would use the complaint structure that Wade talks about as a check. As a result eventually every police station will be held to and brought up to the standard of the most efficient and least corrupt police station in Bangalore. But if we use the second incentive of Wade's construct, it seems like the standard can be raised even further.

So let's consider the other incentive of wanting to be "transferred to a desirable post" that Wade talks about (Wade, 1985). There are two arguments to be made under this incentive.

a) The "geomap" of corruption can attract businesses and investment to areas of low corruption hence making those areas "desirable posts"

b) Now the official is actually noticed for having a high ethical or moral standard.

To bolster part a), Josê Edgardo L. Campos tells us that as a result of his data analysis, he has deduced that "(a) those with high levels of corruption and low predictability are the worst off in terms of attracting private investment; (b) those with high levels but greater predictability are better off than those in (a)…those with low levels of corruption…are the most well-off" (Campos, 1999). So it becomes clear that private investment is more likely to be drawn to areas with low level of corruption among the various government departments, and since we have found for instance that the Hanumantha Nagar area has low corruption in not just its police station but also its civic agencies (BDA, BWSSB, BESCOM, BBMP) while Kengeri area has high corruption in all of these fields, private investment is now more likely to be drawn to Hanumantha Nagar (now that it has been disabused of the notion that all government department locations everywhere are equally bad and corrupt). This would automatically increase the desirability of that area, hence ensuring a parallel incentive structure for a government official: that of making his own area desirable by being ethical and moral, instead of trying to shoot for one of the very few highly selective, highly coveted "desirable" posts in the status quo.

This is the essence of point b). The government office branch is *recognized* for being moral and upright by greater public & private investment. While this serves as a positive reinforcement for officials in presently "undesirable" posts, it also serves as

a stick for the officials in the presently "desirable" posts. If the official in a desirable post doesn't want to be transferred out to an undesirable post, he has to meet the standards of the officials in the "undesirable" posts (who already have the incentive to maintain a higher standard as proven previously) himself (or even surpass them) to avoid disgruntling the public and scaring away private investment (which could make his "desirable" post less desirable). This in turn sets an even higher standard for the official in an undesirable post. Transfers gotten by bribes will still exist of course until there is a paradigm change in culture, but this geomap of information creates a parallel system of incentives which can then induce this change in the long run.

b) For Leadership: From the example of Bangalore's Citizen Report Cards, it seems that the leadership of public administrative agencies is generally amenable to changes and improvements when faced with factual information collected by civil society. As the example of the Bangalore Report Cards shows, the dissemination of information of corruption and administration increases civic awareness among ordinary citizens and draws a lot of media attention (Ravindra, 2004). This makes sense, because given that the leaders of the public administrative agencies are the most visible and hence most vulnerable to this increased civic awareness, they have the natural incentive to improve the quality of administration and provision of public services. They are incentivized to consider macro-level innovations like in the aftermath of the two Citizen Report Cards (Ravindra, 2004). They are now also able to consider regional micro-level changes, because the issues are clearly delineated by office location. Further, since the office profiles will now also consist of their views of the

employees at the respective office (as fully explained in part a)), the leaders will have to face up to both the citizens and the officials, and can no longer use one to justify the situation of the other. Their recommendations will be tailored much more to the individual nature of each location; and the increased civic awareness can hold the leaders to this standard if they fail to meet it.

c) For Policymakers: "Politicians are active in influencing transfers" (Wade, 1985). Hence by the effective complaints system talked about in point a), they are able to act as a check on the system. But Wade concedes that this isn't nearly strong enough. In many cases, he says, "what matters from the legislators' point of view is whether they are getting a satisfactory share of what the officials collect, or whether the officials are being sufficiently favorable to contractors-suppliers on whom they depend for finance, or to groups of electors whom they wish to oblige" (Wade, 1985). While the effective complaints system is in play with the latter two cases, it is not even a factor in the first case, and since the information on the performance of departments is usually not enough for an "effective public interest check", this complaints system has largely been an unofficial and corrupt system in its own right (ibid). But given the legitimacy that has been accorded to the Bangalore Citizen Report Cards by the legislators of the time (they responded enthusiastically by introducing new policies, creating the Bangalore Agenda Task Force etc) (Ravindra, 2004, pp 15), it seems like location-based information that is used to track the performances of individual government offices would significantly bolster, legitimize and make more transparent the complaints system and would constitute a sufficient indicator of performance of departments to constitute an "effective

public interest check". As a result the balance would shift and the two latter cases would gain sufficient legitimacy, expression and sway to outweigh the first case (ibid), and hence lead to a less corrupt political class (at least to this small extent of not taking a cut of bribes from officials and basing their administrative decisions on that) and one that acts as a more significant check on local administrative agencies.

But more interestingly, we have found that corruption seems to be clustered in certain areas across multiple departments. It seems that multiple government departments in Kengeri are corrupt while multiple government departments in Hanumantha Nagar are not as corrupt. The fact that levels of corruption manifest themselves in geographical clusters could imply that it is representative of the work ethic/accountability mechanisms/personal moral rectitude that the policymaker in charge of each individual geographic cluster embodies. This could have very negative consequences for the future re-election prospects for the current Kengeri MLA for instance. Hence this is a strong incentive to act on the geomap's information.

5. Dissemination of Information

This section will deal with how we're disseminating the above data, and how that bolsters and builds on the various incentive structures discussed in the previous section. We're disseminating this data that we have collected in two different ways:

1. The Dares Initiative

2. Traditional Press and the Internet

5.1 The Dares Initiative

5.1.1 What it is:

In the movie *Rang De Basanti*, one of the protagonists says of starting a revolution against the British in the country (this is based in the pre-independence era), "For those in this country that have been deaf for so long: an explosion is needed to wake them up" (Rang De Basanti, 2006). And he followed this up by throwing harmless smoke bombs in a meeting of the British high command and courting arrest, so he can have a loud revolutionary public trial.

While we aren't breaking laws or looking to court arrest, we have a similar aim with the "dares" initiative. This is our initiative to being our research and data to the forefront and to the attention of not just the decision makers and people in power, but also to the everyday public (because a lot of our trends involve the public's behavior also). Based on the trends we observe in our data, we are conducting wacky, crazy, young, and attention-grabbing dares that are tailored to the trend that we observe in a particular office, or a zone.

5.1.2 The Experience of the first live dare

On 9th August 2011, we went into the Jayanagar RTO when it was packed (around 11:00 am in the morning) armed with a guitar and sang the Indian national anthem at the top of our voices. There were 7 of us, and we had teamed up with Dreamscope Theatre, a theater group based in Bangalore. We did this because we found that the Jayanagar RTO was found to be one of the more corrupt RTOs (in terms of bribes and middlemen that had to be used) and the second worst RTO ranked in terms of efficiency in Bangalore (with a service rating

of 4.19/10). We hoped that we would shock some people and officers out of their comfort zone and create an atmosphere of patriotism that might encourage a reduction in the collection or giving of bribes for at least some time.

We left a set of pamphlets on the ground after which had the Jayanagar RTO's "service rating", its rank amongst all the RTOs, a tidbit about how middlemen in the RTO on average only increased the "speed of service rating" from 4.276/10 to 4.492/10, and a link to our website. People and officers were quite jolted out of their comfort zone. As we were leaving, people jostled to get a pamphlet from the ground, and they came down and talked to us about our data, asked us what advice we had, what other tidbits we could give them, and even offered us suggestions on how to improve reach next time.

5.1.3 Why this will work and will have an effect

In their paper, "Performance Activism and Civic Engagement Through Symbolic and Playful Actions", Arvind Singhal and Karen Greiner explore the "role of performance activism in enthusing, engaging, and mobilizing a citizenry" (Singhal, 2008, pp 2). They analyze Gandhi's "mass mobilization protests in India, Antanas Mockus' playful civic engagement strategies in Bogota, Colombia, and the playful actions of 'Billionaires for Bush' in the United States" and conclude that "symbols and play, taken together, represent highly powerful tools of spurring civic engagement, building social movements, and promoting social justice" (ibid). This is because these "playful, symbolic actions" provide an avenue to engage with power in a disarming, nonviolent, unconventional way that creates new social relations between the people in power/government and the powerless/citizenry and between & among the powerless/citizenry itself (Shepard, 2008). These new "social

relations" are always a result of the element of surprise in these playful, symbolic actions (ibid).

For Indian citizens, "giving in to corruption could be down to "deep powerlessness"" (Burke, 2011), and hence if anything this initiative allows for the creation of new "social relations" in the spirit of the above three mentioned examples of "playful" social change. For instance, our next "dare" will involve a zombie-like dance in the spirit of Michael Jackson's Thriller at a government office which has the record of having the lowest "speed of service" rating (hence fitting the slow zombie stereotype).

This also ties in with Wade's "desirable post-undesirable post" incentive structure that was discussed in the previous section. Since performance activism is so attention grabbing and is able to create new "social relations" by diminishing the power held by the government officers over the citizens; and since our performance activism is directly tied to trends that we have found in our location-based data, it is more than likely that the act of performance activism can accelerate the branding of desirability or undesirability. For instance, in the previous section, there was a discussion as to why Kengeri's police station would become an undesirable post and Hanumantha Nagar police station a desirable post using our location-based geomaps. This process depends on how far and fast the data the Kengeri is more inefficient and corrupt can actually travel. The more and faster it can travel, the more this theory will actually work. And one of the best ways to bring immediate and complete attention to the situation at Kengeri is by putting it under the spotlight with performance activism, viz. a dare that we perform there. This initiative hence helps bring the data to the fore and allows Wade's theory to actualize.

5.2 Traditional Press and the Internet:

5.2.1 Concrete steps taken

We have already had a feature done on our research and our project in the Times of India (The Times of India, 2011), which is the largest circulation English language daily in the world. Further we are building a website and a social media campaign with the "geomap" of corruption & efficiency of service demarcated across the city of Bangalore. This "geomap" of Bangalore is something that has quite a few newspapers interested already (especially given the recent protests against corruption in India (multiple news outlets)). We are also distributing individual tidbits of information as already outlined in the section "What We Found" through the traditional press and the Internet. Our dares initiative is also going viral to crowd source the ideation of and participation in of dares around the city and country.

5.2.2 Why this will work and will have an effect

In a paper by the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, it says about the Bangalore Citizen Report Cards: "the Bangalore experience illustrates what can be achieved when a dynamic organization, the PAC, is able to conduct rigorous surveys of the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with government performance, is able to ensure a high level of media coverage of the findings, and is able to both persuade and provide some support to government agencies to help them improve their performance" (Ravindra, 2004). The first two parts can be extrapolated to *Shudhify,* viz. conducting "surveys…(of) government performance" and "ensuring…media coverage". "*India* enjoys free and *lively media*, freedom of assembly and association, and considerable scope to express political dissent and protest" (Kohli, 2001, pp 3), hence ensuring media coverage will lead to an end,

because as talked about in the previous section under incentives for the leadership of these government agencies, the media coverage will incentivize the heads of the agencies towards action. Further, in terms of working with government agencies, *Shudhify* is working with government agencies on a deeper level than the CRCs did by even collecting the views of employees at these offices (hence making change more acceptable, since the government is part of the process and solution).

The geomap, once it is ready, will likely be published in leading newspaper dailies in India (as already mentioned, we've already had significant interest in this). The traditional press can garner attention to it and offer their take/critiques, and the internet can hold all the hard data and the detailed trends and geomap information. The combination of these could lend us the credence that would really incentivize and accelerate the process of the private and public investment "moving" preferentially to places of less corruption and higher efficiency, hence ensuring and accelerating the creation of the mechanisms talked about in the previous section.

Finally for a crowd-sourced dares initiative focused on better, less corrupt governance (that can only be possible on a media platform like the internet that emphasizes collective participation), the "success" of the initiative is defined by having "sufficient members participating in it" (Sharma 2010, pp 8-9). In Sharma's model of crowdsourcing success, "motive alignment of the crowd is the central idea" to achieving this critical mass of members (ibid).

Based on testimony collected by Jason Burke of *The Guardian*, "the grinding daily routine of petty corruption…is at the root" of the widespread recent protests in India against corruption (Burke, 2011). If anything the manifestation of this alignment of motives

between this project and the "crowd" of Indian citizens is very strong right now and hence fulfils Sharma's metric of drawing the critical mass. This ensures that the crowd-sourced "Dares" initiative garners attention to itself and to the root problems it's trying to deal with. But this extant "motive alignment" also has wider implications in that dissemination of this data among the wider citizenry of India (which is also technically crowdsourcing) will be that much faster and successful. And performance activism done on this scale, organized through the internet will further the theoretical results that we extrapolated from Wade's observations and the location-based profiles, by ensuring that the underlying data travels far and fast (as also explained in the previous subsection).

Conclusion

This entire paper is based around the argument of why we believe that the methodology of data collection & analysis that we adopted can make a true change in actual service delivery on the ground by government agencies (viz. make them more honest and efficient) and improve the experience of citizens at their point of contact with government offices.

There is a gap in current M&E systems of data collection and dissemination with respect to government administration in India (run by NGOs or the government). Almost every one of them that has gained any traction deals with a macro approach, viz. the working of/corruption in/efficiency of government agencies as a whole. While these can and have helped in making macro-level policymaking by government agencies more transparent and accountable, they have largely been unable to create M&E capacities on the level of daily execution of government policies by government officers at the first point of contact between citizens and the government, and as the 2005 Transparency International Indian

corruption study tells us, it is this level which is most directly tied to citizen welfare and where the most improvement needs to be made.

In light of this, we decided to fill this gap by creating a location-based data collection paradigm. By conducting random sample surveys of citizens with a simple questionnaire (that was developed with the help of expert inputs and research) that attempts to get a snapshot of the citizen's experience with government services, on location at each branch of the government agencies within Bangalore city, we are able to:

a) Minimize the skew of perception bias and self-fulfilling prophecy bias while still conducting a completely perception based survey (because we are asking for their responses in direct relation to the service they just received (or didn't receive) at the office they were just at).

b) Begin to create a "geomap" of inefficiency and corruption in Bangalore city, hence giving government officers, government leadership, and citizens the ability to compare service provision and execution of tasks between different branches of the same agency, and also across different agencies within the same geographic area.

c) Find data trends that have policy implications on a micro and macro level, while also affecting decision-making of citizens on a micro and macro level.

On said data collection and analysis (which included a ratings algorithm that aggregated all the answers to our questionnaire to develop ratings for individual office branches), we found several data points that reflect the above two points. This location-based paradigm is likely to introduce various new incentives/mechanisms to radically improve current service provision on the ground by the government and its agencies for the actors involved in the following ways:

The citizens of Bangalore are more likely to hold the government agency branches that they are dealing with to the standard of the best government agency branches in the city, and the presence of this above data is likely to reduce their tolerance of inefficiency and corruption. Further private investment is more likely to be attracted to places of low corruption and high efficiency. The government officers are more likely to work better, because they are actually noticed for it in relation to their counterparts in other parts of the city, and they are driven by the incentive to be transferred to a more "desirable" post. Further since honest efficient work can attract dedicated private investment and hence make any post "desirable", this incentive of desirability is further bolstered. Finally this location-based data which captures both micro and macro trends enables the government leadership to make directed decisions and policies.

Finally, the methods of dissemination that we have adopted, viz. performance activism and internet & traditional press bolster the above incentive structures while adding new ones of their own hence creating a virtuous cycle that can lead to a decrease in corruption and an improvement in government efficacy.

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APPENDIX:
Ratings Algorithm:
We asked the following questions of people and assigned the following weights to each question (weightage out of 100 points):

- How simple and organized was the process?   **15 points**
- How helpful and accessible were the government officers?   **15 points**
- How fast did you get what you came for?   **20 points**
- How costly (in terms of work hours missed, cost of various forms and signatures that were required etc) was the process? 10=most expensive, 1=least expensive   **20 points**
- How clean were your surroundings?   **10 points**

Citizens were asked to answer with Yes/No

- Did you use a middleman for the service?   **-15 points if yes,   0 points if no**
- Were you threatened in any way? [had to pay/were asked for a bribe, etc] **If yes, then -10 points. If no, but a middleman WAS used, then 0 points. If no, and no middleman was used, then 10 points.**
- Would you want to use this office again if you had a choice? **10 points (full 10 points for yes, and 0 for no)**

Notes:

- Hence, if an office was given a rating of 2/10 for the "simple and organized" field, then it would be assigned 3 points for that question in that survey and similarly for all the other fields.
- Using this algorithm, we get a rating from the responses in each individual survey we collect at a particular office, and then take the mean of all the ratings gotten from the surveys of each office to obtain the overall rating for the office.
- Once we get the overall number of points out of 100, we divide it by 10 so we can get a rating out of 10. So if an office got 57 points, then it would be assigned a rating of 5.7/10 for that particular survey.