After reading Straus’ article and hearing Erin Jessee speak I was reflecting on their thoughts and found myself fixated on the issues surrounding the national narrative. Jessee spoke on the entrenchment and pervasiveness of the national narrative in Rwanda while Straus echoed these sentiments that show an encouragement of a type of tribal history that completely ignores the arbitrariness of territorial divisions imposed by colonialism and imperialism. Is there some truth to the polarization of ethnicity in pre-colonial era? And because history is used strategically as a tool to shift responsibility and blur true intentions, what would it mean for a transformation of this national narrative? What would incorporating a more complex history of Rwanda involve for both domestic and international attitudes? Is looking at such a transformation, essentially looking at the reconfiguration of the entire Rwanda society and culture? Or is it simply a guise to manipulate and paralyze the international community and most Rwandans understand this?

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In my first reading of the article “For Beginners, By Beginners: Knowledge Construction under the Rwandese Patriotic Front”, I was reminded of an idea discussed in Benedict Andersen’s Imagined Communities.  In creating his argument that the history of nations and groups is imagined, Andersen claims that this is done, in part, through convenient forgetting.  This can be seen in the history of the United States for example, where we like to examine ourselves as purveyors of freedom and justice for the downtrodden, while forgetting about the many people we as a nation stepped upon in our creation.  According to the Pottier article, this forgetting in the creation of a Rwandan national identity involves forgetting the existence of ethnic based systems prior to the arrival of German colonizers.

In this particular history, the RPF claims that history prior to Rwanda’s colonization was only minimally unfair with little emphasis on ethnicity.  Pottier’s article cites varying forms of revisionist history, which place a large blame on colonialism for creating the issue of ethnicity within Rwanda.  While it is true that colonialism in Rwanda certainly involved a lack of respect for the colonized (something that is true within nearly all colonies), it is incorrect to assume that (1) Rwanda’s colonizers created these ethnicities, and (2) post colonial society in Rwanda was idyllic.  According to Pottier, neither of these statements are true.  First, colonists certainly emphasized ethnicity when labeling the Rwandans, and the Belgium colonial powers were certainly responsible in part for entrenching ethnicity in bureaucratic society; however, the categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were already in place when Germany first colonized Rwanda.  Next, some modern ‘scholars’ of Rwanda thrive on creating a history that claims that post-colonial Rwanda was idyllic.  These ideas fit well into an RPF narrative by creating historical evidence that Rwandan society would be best served by erasing ethnicity all together.  While these claims make sense from a political point of view for the people in power, they are not historically accurate, and do not properly portray the way in which pre-colonial society operated.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front supports such understandings and the scholars that portray them because they fit a political agenda; however, this creation of history serves no one.  By ignoring the true history of Rwanda, the government is preventing this and future generations from being able to learn from the mistakes of not only the colonial governments, but of past Rwandan rulers as well.

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After having conducted additional research regarding Rwanda, I stumbled upon an interesting article that I felt was relevant to our discussion about a post-genocidal state and the bureaucratic nature of Rwanda. The article focuses on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the failures this justice system has demonstrated in a post-genocidal era in Rwanda. One statement that truly stood out to me suggested, “The tribunal has been slow and costly. Some have also questioned its focus solely on the Hutus who led the genocide against minority Tutsis and not on any war crimes that might have been committed by the other side”. Moreover, the article explicated that the court will be shutting down in 2014 because costs have surpassed one billion dollars. After reading both of these statements explained within the article, I found myself wondering whether or not Kagame’s regime has its hands in the systematic processes of the tribunal. We have discussed on numerous occasions the bureaucracy that is prevalent within Rwanda politics, and I wonder whether or not the current regime has had any role to play with respect to the claim that Hutus have been the sole focus of the tribunal while the Tutsi have not. Has Kagame influenced these trials so that Tutsis are not tried for war crimes? Furthermore, the fact that these trials have cost in excess of one billion dollars truly raises some red flags about the functionality the trials as well as the layers of bureaucracy that are tied up in the tribunal.

For any one who is interested in the article here is the link:  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-rwanda-genocide-idUSBRE9170OL20130208

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Erin Jessee concluded her Skype talk by leaving us with a question to think about: what type of research is possible within Rwanda? She explained that, in her experience and the experiences of her fellow researchers, any type of research with a semblance of a human rights agenda or political sensitivity would be difficult to conduct (/be approved by the government). Jessee’s piece, “Conducting fieldwork in Rwanda,” acts as a “guide” (abstract) for individuals applying to conduct research in Rwanda and demonstrates the obstacles that one might encounter in the application process.

To begin, Jessee urges researchers to “familiarise themselves not only with best practices for ethics when working with human subjects and so-called vulnerable populations, but also with the political climate presently affecting Rwanda” (267). Here, Jessee points out how the tensioned environment in Rwanda adds an additional layer of complexity to working with human subjects. Implicitly, this shows a fundamental challenge of conducting research in any post-conflict situation – it is at the same time more appealing and more difficult to navigate and complete.

Jessee very directly states that “researchers whose projects touch upon sensitive issues such as the 1994 genocide or the evaluation of government development and reconciliation initiatives should expect to encounter difficulties” (271). The fact that Jessee wrote her article in 2012 — 16 years after the genocide — proves that the after affects of the genocide are still being felt in Rwanda, both in terms of national re-growth and personalized trauma. This, in turn, suggests that post-genocide reconciliation has not been overwhelmingly successful. While I acknowledge that the atrocities of the violence affect victims and perpetrators alike for a lifetime, perhaps the fact that it is still too sensitive to reflect on the genocide 16 years later means that many Rwandans have not effectively dealt with the violence.

Lastly, in speaking about the role of relationships in research, Jessee emphasizes the importance of the researcher assuming a positive and informed relationship with the local community. During her Skype talk, she described a general “Rwandan discomfort” with interviews and sensed “fear” and “paranoia” among locals. Reading Jessee’s piece, I couldn’t help but attribute the “jumping through hoops” nature of the application process to control and censorship of the government. Thus, I wonder how much of these paranoia feelings are caused by personal feelings of traumatization and how much is a result of government intimidation, the influence of the policy of national unity and reconciliation and perhaps, the lack of confrontation and closure many Rwandans received in gacaca.

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In the readings thus far we have seen that there are a multiplicity of interconnected, reinforcing patterns of interaction between those of different ‘ethnicities’, regional associations, economic statuses, lineage ties, and genders that contributed to the outburst of violence in 1994. However, one observation about the source of violence during the genocide that I believe to be particularly astute was Erin Jessee’s identification of evidence of fear rather than genocidal intent for the average Hutu imprisoned for genocide. I believe that fear, varying in magnitude from the all-encompassing to the minute, is likely one of the most powerful driving forces behind the motivation or pressure to engage in the violence of 1994. In numerous of our readings, as well as in Jessee’s lecture, we have learned that economic disparities, restrictions to social mobility through the denial of education for certain individuals, different regional political or social histories, as well as other institutionalized inequalities determine life chances. These factors may be seen to play into minute rarely recognized fears, such as fear of missing an opportunity to gain economically and socially or fear of losing existing power or means of survival. The fear of death by one’s ‘enemy’ is the all-encompassing fear, which has historically been more widely purported by historians. A consequence of understanding the violence solely through this conception of fear is that it frames the genocide as an all-against-all conflict in which the Tutsis fell victim to the Hutus.

Theorists such as Pottier assert that this history needs to be rewritten, that “reconciliation will not be possible without a nuanced, shared understanding of history” in which the designation of victimhood is not so clear cut along ‘ethnic’ divides (126). This all-against-all conception is not only misleading, but serves to reproduce a specific social memory that is detrimental to the goal of a cohesive Rwandan identity. While the Rwandan government professes the desire to establish a national identity, one can see in documents such as the The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies published by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in 2004 how they consistently undermine such state objectives. Statements such as “tribal associations changed automatically into politically parties” as well as “primacy of identity has excessively dominated ideologies of political parties” lead one to believe that conflicting ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ groups is a long-lasting, pre-colonial issue and rules out the potential for conceiving of any collaboration between ‘types’.

It appears from our readings and class discussions that, in order for national unity to be achieved, social, political, economic, regional, and gender equality needs to improve. While I think Pottier’s demand is crucial, his assertion seemed to still be framed around the controversial issue of identifying either Hutus or Tutsis as victims. Such a framing of the discussion only serves to reify the ‘ethnic’ divisions. I wonder, how does one reach a more nuanced understanding of who fell victim to whom and under what circumstances without inciting the notion of ‘ethnicity’?

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Though the soldiers in the film did have a striking view on killing the enemy, it is certainly not their fault.  Instead, it seems necessary to have this approach.  While I will not pretend to understand how or why these veterans think what they think, it seems that it was essential to their own survival.  In basic training, a soldier is broken down and built back up from scratch.  The purpose is to erase your individuality and condition you to obey orders all the while ensuring your survival.  Morality seems to often fall by the wayside in this process, giving way to a kill-or-be-killed complex.  Perhaps the mind, in an effort to cope with such conditioning produces a state of denial in which the soldier derives pleasure from killing.  Maybe this is why soldiers would often joke about horrifying aspects of war in trying to deal with it.  Otherwise, from my own perception, one would break down into a form of shell-shock.  My belief in these things is only strengthened by the fact that these men still seem to be stuck in the past.  In the film’s interviews, the veterans recount the experiences in vivid detail and the emotions they felt then do not seem to have faded.  War undoubtedly causes lasting psychological damage, but it seems that the preparation for war is the first instance of such damage.  Soldiers are first trained to lose their humanity so that they can commit inhumane acts.  Though this might be the best way to ensure their survival, it seems to also generate a never ending cycle that men cannot escape even decades after a war.

Though the Rwandan genocide is a bit different than trained soldiers killing, it seems the people had the same sort of kill-or-be-killed mentality.  So, neighbors turning on neighbors is more of a result of a survival complex as well.

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After reading Umutesi’s chapter “Survival in the Camps at Kivu,” I was struck by the ingenuity Umutesi and her neighbor’s displayed in overcoming many of the challenges present in the refugee camps in Kivu.  However, I was also simultaneously appalled by the lack of foresight humanitarian organizations displayed, as well as their perceived indifference to the plight of Hutu refugees because “After Habyarimana’s assassination in 1994 and the ensuing genocide, a large part of the world saw all Hutu as genocidal, from the old woman who could hardly walk to the baby still nursing at his mother’s breast.  As we saw it, this negative perception explained, in part, the lack of urgency manifested by the humanitarian NGOs and the international community in coming to our aid” (73).

Even when humanitarian organizations provided aid to the refugees, basic living conditions were not fulfilled; the low amounts of firewood that the organizations provided meant that the refugees were forced to forage for firewood–often the women who gathered firewood were raped.  Umutesi states, “the number of women raped while gathering firewood in the plantations of Zaire is incalculable” (79).  The security forces organized to “protect” the camps also proved more of a nuisance than anything–“Like all soldiers, those of the CZSC loved women and money too much” (82).  The lack of feminine products was also felt by the female refugees.

It was astounding to me how much Umutesi was able to accomplish and organize in the camps.  It seemed to underline her power and status within her community–not only that she was able to accomplish individual tasks, but that she was self-assured and protected enough to accomplish even the minute tasks she set out to do.  I wonder what a less-fortunate occupant of the camps would recount.

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In almost every piece of literature I read about Rwanda, there always seems to be mentioning of the fact that Rwandans are so similar in a variety of aspects – same religion, same language, same cultural customs, same neighborhoods, intermarriage, etc. As Umutesi writes, prior to the genocide: “When one looked at the reality of the socio-economic conditions in which the great majority of the Rwandan population lived, there was no difference between Hutu and Tutsi. All faced the same difficulties linked to insufficient agricultural production” (Umutesi 2004: 36). Straus too notes this similarity: “Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language (Kinyarwanda); they belong to the same clans, they live in the same regions and, in most areas, the same neighborhoods; they have the same cultural practices and myths; and they have the same religions. Many also intermarry” (2006: 19-20). Even the NURC report hints at this cultural similarity through its metaphoric language blaming colonial powers for identifying “antagonisms which today are putting the country of the thousand hills to fire and sword” (14). It is no wonder, then, why people are astonished that such a shared culture could turn against one another.

So, where did it all go wrong? In other words, what were the causes of the 1994 genocide? It seems evident in all 3 readings for Thursday the population began to implode thanks to careful calculation and political procedures emanating from the top of society/government. NURC admits that, “the post-colonial predatory powers, instead of getting the country ride of the negative colonial practices, have often institutionalized them for the power” (20). It tries to pin Rwandan democracy as historically (since Social Revolution of 1959 and up until 1994) excluding and victimizing Tutsis. Straus counters this by referring to Habyarimana’s rule which saw a diminish in anti-Tutsi discrimination (2006: 23), yet admits to the fact that “the new consensus holds that specific Hutu hardliners are responsible for the genocide” (Straus 2006: 31).

I am amazed at the sheer power of political manipulation, and how a society that “shares so much in common” can, over time, seemingly implode – and yet at the same time hold on to this idea that society still shares so much in common. A question to the class: do you think Rwandans are still as similar as the literature makes them out to be today? What are your reactions to the policy of national unity? Can one Rwanda for all truly be attained?

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While attempting to write this blog post my coach came and sat across from me to ask me what I was doing.  After explaining what this class entailed, I told him I was trying to come up with a topic to blog about.  He proceeded to ask me about how to define genocide and how I would classify the Rwandan genocide and ultimately wanted to know what caused it.  While trying to explain different aspects of this specific genocide the idea of a “deep ethnic hatred”, also known as an “ancient tribal hatred” popped into my mind.  I quickly recalled Strau’s chapter “Background to the Genocide” and assumed that my coach, like many, had most likely been misinformed about the Rwandan genocide and has been most likely led to believe it was caused by a deep ethnic hatred.  I went on to explain that the genocide did not occur because of a deep ethnic hatred, but rather because of a combination of issues and difference such as regional, gender, religion, and class differences.  Most importantly, I highlighted that it wasn’t that all Hutu hated all Tutsi and all Tutsi hated Hutu, but rather it was extremists from both groups representing and acting as representation for a larger population of bystanders.

According to Straus “the notion that an ancient tribal hatred drove the Rwandan genocide is deeply misleading”.  Struas proceeds to explain that colonial manipulation of ethnicity in Rwanda, the planning and organization of the genocide before it happened, and the responsibility of certain Rwandans instigating the genocide.  The last reason mentioned is one that I believe is often overlooked by many, but is in fact very important to understanding the cause of the genocide.

Throughout this course the idea that the entire Rwandan nation was not supporting or participating in the genocide and that it was certainly not a deep rooted ethnic hatred has been implemented in a majority of the classes.  It was most simply two groups of extremists, mostly positioned in urban areas of the country, expressing and acting on their personal hatred for the other ethnicity, using the voice of some to represent the voice of many.  As Straus explains, Hutus and Tutsi speak the same language, live in the same regions and neighborhoods, practice the same religions, and even intermarry.

People studying and or teaching about the Rwandan genocide have to stop teaching it as a genocide rooted ethnic hatred.  If people generalized the voice of a few as the voice of everyone then people around the world would believe all Americans loved President Bush or that everyone one wearing a turban is a terrorist.  It’s pure ignorance.  We have to debunk such notions because it will not only provide the correct information about the Rwandan genocide and give us a better understanding of why it happened, but might also prevent genocides in the future.

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This film was by far the most heart-breaking thing I have ever seen since I became a PCON student. And this comes from someone who has done a thesis on sexual violence in war and other research papers on the theme of rape. I have read many reports with personal accounts of rape victims that described intimate, absolutely gruesome details of what was done to them. However, this was the first time that I could put faces to these horrendous stories and that just made me bawl throughout the film.

Similar to Emily, I noticed how many victims atributted the Interhamwe as the main perpetrator of rape. Lisa Jackson, the director, even mentions at some point how rapists were hutus who fled from Rwanda, something incorrect as we’ve learned in class. They seemed to equalize the Interhamwe to a Hutu militia. But then again, that was not the main focus of the movie, so I don’t see that as a decisive factor in my opinion on the film.

Furthermore, I also did not have the same perception of Jackson that Dagan had. Maybe the filmmaker said something in the beggining of the film that slipped my mind, but in no way I think she went to the DRC to “empower” the women. Her sole purpose there was to document the womens’ stories, to let them be heard by someone else besides the members of their self-help groups. Handing out nail polish will obviously not change these women’s lives and Jackson, as a rape survivor herself, knows that. I just see it as a nice gesture of a person in an unknown country trying to make connections with people she does not share a language with, so I see no reason to criticize her for that. There is nothing wrong with giving out small gifts as a sign of appreciation. I do not see how me bringing little Brazilian tokens like chocolates and earrings to American friends is any different.

The most shocking and surprising part to me was how Jackson managed to interview some of the rebel fighters. The questions she asked however, left me unsatisfied. I wish she could have dug deeper into how they do what they do. I felt like the men just became these impossible-to-comprehend monsters, evil forces that no one who is ‘normal’ will ever understand.

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